Assessing Punitive Damages... by Sunstein, Cass R. et al.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and
Economics Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
1997
Assessing Punitive Damages...
Cass R. Sunstein
Daniel Kahneman
David Schkade
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade, "Assessing Punitive Damages..." (Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics
Working Paper No. 50, 1997).
ASSESSING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
(WITH NOTES ON COGNITION AND VALUATION IN LAW)
Cass R. Sunstein,1 Daniel Kahneman,2 and David Schkade3
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Two Goals
This Article has two goals. The first is to investigate the
sources of arbitrariness in punitive damage awards.4 This
investigation, which we believe to be the first of its kind, helps
to answer an important question: What are the sources of
unpredictability in punitive damage awards?5 On the basis of
                                                                                                   
1 Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and
Department of Political Science, University of Chicago.
2 Eugene Higgins Professor of Psychology and Professor of Public
Affairs, Princeton University.
3 Professor of Management and William W. Spriegel Fellow, Graduate
School of Business, University of Texas, Austin. The authors are grateful
to Exxon Corporation for financial support of the empirical study contained
in this Article; Exxon Corporation bears no responsibility for our analysis or
our conclusions. We are grateful to Richard Craswell, Richard Epstein,
Dan Kahan, William Landes, Tracey Meares, Martha Nussbaum, Eric
Posner, and Richard Posner for valuable comments. We are also grateful
to participants in the rationality workshop at the University of California,
Berkeley and the law and economics and legal theory workshops at the
University of Chicago. J.B. Heaton provided research assistance and
excellent comments.
4 A technical version of the survey and study, accompanied with more
detailed statistical analysis, is reported in Daniel Kahneman, David
Schkade, and Cass R. Sunstein, Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards: The
Psychology of Punitive Damages, J. of Risk and Uncertainty (forthcoming
1998). This paper provides a nontechnical summary of our findings and
develops, as that paper does not, its implications for law and legal reform.
5 We do not contend that we have identified the only source. See TAN
infra. There are also questions about the difference between experimental
and real-world conditions. See TAN infra.
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responses from 899 jury-eligible citizens, we estimate the
results of deliberations consisting of all-white juries, all-
African-American juries, all-female juries, all-male juries, all-
wealthy juries, all-poor juries, and juries of widely diverse
degrees of age and education.
Our principal conclusions, stated briefly, are that people’s
moral judgments are remarkably widely shared, but that
people have a great deal of difficulty in mapping their moral
judgments onto an unbounded scale of dollars. Erratic,
unpredictable, and arbitrary awards, possibly even
meaningless awards, are a potential product of this difficulty.
Since participants in law are frequently asked to map their
judgments onto an unbounded dollar scale, this answer
relates not only to punitive damage reform but also to a
number of other positive and normative questions now faced
by the legal system, including the law governing libel, awards
for pain and suffering, sexual harassment and other civil
rights violations, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
administrative penalties, and contingent valuation. In addition
to identifying serious problems in current practices, our study
points in the direction of a large and potentially fruitful
research agenda.
Our second goal involves what might be called the
behavioral analysis of law. In the last three decades, a great
deal of progress has come from the application, to legal
problems, of a certain understanding of economics.6 Within
economics and psychology, but outside law, that
understanding has been under sustained attack.7 Within
social science generally, the attack has produced insights that
supplement, and sometimes undermine, those versions of
economics that have undergirded economic analysis of law.8
                                                                                                   
6 See Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (5th ed. 1997) for a
wide range of relevant discussions.
7 A good recent collection is William Goldstein and Robin Hogarth,
Research on Judgment and Decisionmaking (1997).
8 There are some important exceptions. See, e.g., Edward McCaffery,
Matthew Spitzer, and Daniel Kahneman, Framing the Jury, 81 Va. L Rev
ASSESSING PUNITIVE DAMAGES 3
These  insights very much bear on law. Our study helps show
what might be missing, impractical, or wrong in standard
economic approaches to punitive damage awards, and in a
way that bears on a range of additional issues as well.9
B. Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards
The award of punitive damages has become one of the
most controversial and important uses of the tort law,
extending well beyond the common law to such statutory
areas as environmental protection and employment
discrimination.10 Punitive damages are allowed in forty-seven
of the fifty states,11 and over sixty federal statutes now permit
the award of punitive damages, making judicial review of
punitive awards a significant part of federal law.12
The purposes of such awards are not obscure. Sometimes
compensatory awards provide insufficient deterrence of
                                                                                                   
1341 (1995); Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich, and Amos Tversky,
Context-Dependence in Legal Decisionmaking, 25 J. Legal Stud. 287
(1996); George Loewenstein and Linda Babcock, Explaining Bargaining
Impasse, 11 J. Econ. Persp. 109 (1997).
9 See A. Michell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An
Economic Analysis, Harv L Rev (1997) (forthcoming). In brief, the
difficulty with the Polinsky/Shavell suggestion— that juries should decide
punitive damage problems by reference to the likelihood that the
defendant’s acts will go undetected— is that it does not deal with
psychological and institutional problems that sharply limit jurors’ capacity
and willingness to analyze the punitive damage problem in the way they
suggest. Thus a reader might conclude from the Polinsky/Shavell analysis
that punitive damages should be assessed by an administrative agency, or
some other expert body, and not by juries or even judges. See TAN infra.
10 See the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. 1977A.
11 See Richard Blatt et al., Punitive Damages: A State by State Guide
to Law and Practice (1991).
12 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. (a)(11)(3); 7 U.S.C. 18(a)B); 7 U.S.C. 21 (b)
(10); 7 U.S.C. 25(a)(3)(B); 10 USC 2207 (a)(2); 10 USC 2409(c)(C)(2); 15
USC 1681n(2); 15 USC 1681u(i) 15 USC 2622((b)(2)(B); 18 USC
248(cc)(1)(B)); 18 USC 25209(b)(2); 18 USC 2724 (b)(2); 42 USC 300j-9;
42 USC 300a-23; 42 USC 1981a; 42 USC 3613; 42 USC 7622; 42 USC
9607; 42 USC 13981.
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private behavior, simply because injured parties do not detect
and seek compensation for all injuries. Punitive damages can,
in theory, take account of the infrequency of private suits by
penalizing the defendant to the point where it will undertake
optimal precautions.13 Moreover, punitive damages may have
a retributive or expressive function, designed to embody
social outrage at the actions of serious wrongdoers.14 They
may reflect the “sense of the community” about the egregious
character of the defendant’s action.
Understood in these terms, however, punitive awards raise
several puzzles. Such awards interact in complex ways with
public law— with the elaborate network of regulatory
requirements and criminal prohibitions that overlap with the
tort law. These requirements and prohibitions also have
deterrent, retributive, and expressive functions. It is not clear
how they can best be brought together with tort law to
produce a coherent whole.
In recent years, the most important concern is that
whatever their purposes, punitive damages are unpredictable,
even “out of control.”15 One study of 47 counties in eleven
states over a several-year period showed a high degree of
variability:16 Punitive damages were awarded in about 25% of
the successful verdict cases in some counties and not
awarded at all in others.17 Median verdicts ranged from less
than $10,000 in some areas to as much as $204,000 in San
                                                                                                   
13 See William Landes & Richard Posner, The Economic Structure of
Tort Law 160-65, 184-85, 223-24 (1993); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note.
14 See David Owen, The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages, 40
Ala L Rev 705 (1989); Marc Galanter and David Luban, Poetic Justice, 42
Am. U. L. Rev. 1393 (1993); Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in Jean
Hampton and Jeffrie Murphy, Forgiveness and Mercy 111 (1988).
15 John Jeffries, A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive
Damages, 72 Va L Rev 139, 139 (1986).
16 Stephen Daniels and Joane Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive
Damages, 75 Minn L Rev 1 (1990).
17 Id. at 32.
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Diego.18 Another study showed increasingly large awards
against businesses, from a total of $1.1 million in five large
states from 1968 to 1971 to $343 million from 1988 to 1991,
an 89-fold increase.19 A recent study finds that in San
Francisco, California and Cook County, Illinois, punitive
damage awards increased from about $1 million during 1960-
64, to $147 million during 1985-1989, and $215 million during
1990-94.20
On the basis of evidence of this kind, many people have
complained that punitive awards have a “lottery-like”
character21 and require legislative or judicial remedy.22 Thus it
is said, in well-publicized documents, that the arbitrary
character of punitive damage awards is “news to no one,” that
they produce an affront to the rule of law by “distributing
awards in a random and capricious manner,”23 and that they
should be subject to a cap of three times the actual harm.24
                                                                                                   
18 Id. at 42.
19 See Turner et al., Punitive Damages Explosion, Washington Legal
Foundation, Working Paper Series No. 50 (Nov. 1992).
20 Deborah Hensler and Erik Moller, Trends in Punitive Damages:
Preliminary Data from Cook County, Illinois and San Francisco, California
(RAND Institute for Civil Justice unrestricted draft series, March 1995).
See also Rand Institute for Civil Justice, Punitive Damages in Financial
Injury Verdicts (1997) (showing substantial variability and growth in
punitive awards).
21 Peter Huber, No-Fault Punishment, 40 Ala L Rev 1037, 1037
(1989).
22 See Paul Rubin, John Calfee, and Mark Grady, BMW v. Gore:
Mitigating the Punitive Economics of Punitive Damages, 1997 Supreme
Court Economic Review 179, 184; E. Donald Elliott, Why Punitive
Damages Don’t Deter Corporate Misconduct Effectively, 40 Ala. L. Rev.
1053, 1057 (1989). See the attempted response in the Product Liability
Reform Act of 1997, S. 5, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997) (proposing to
require a clear and convincing evidence standard and also to cap punitive
damage awards).
23 Contract with America: The Bold Plan by Rep. Newt Gingrich, Rep.
Dick Armey, and The House Republicans to Change the Nation 154 (Ed
Gillespie and Bob Schellhas eds., 1994).
24 Id. at 147.
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Congress continues to debate bills that would limit the
availability and amount of punitive damages.25
It is not difficult to understand the widespread concern with
erratic punitive damage awards. If similarly situated people—
plaintiffs and defendants alike— are not treated similarly,
erratic awards are unfair. As a matter of fairness, the
evidence suggests that some awards are too low, while others
are too high. From the standpoint of economic efficiency,
unpredictable awards need not be troublesome; perhaps
individual awards cannot be calculated in advance, but if
people can calculate the expected value of the relevant risks,
there should be no efficiency loss. If awards are
unpredictable, however, resources are likely to be wasted on
that calculation, and as a practical matter a risk of extremely
high awards is likely to produce excessive caution in risk-
averse managers and companies.26 Hence unpredictable
awards create both unfairness and (on reasonable
assumptions) inefficiency, 27 in a way that may create
overdeterrence of desirable activity.28
                                                                                                   
25 See, e.g., H.R. 956, 104th Cong, section 2(a) (1995); H.R. 955,
104th Cong, section 8(a), (C) (1995).
26 See Kenneth MacCrimmon and Donald Wehrung, Taking Risks:
The Management of Uncertaity (1986).
27 These concerns about punitive damage awards have not produced
a consensus that punitive damages are unpredictable. Some empirical
work suggests that the aggregate data show a reasonably orderly pattern,
though the relevant data can be interpreted in different ways. See
Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J.
Legal Stud. 623 (1997). A response, coming to a different conclusion on
the basis of the same data, is A. Mitchell Polinsky, Are Punitive Damages
Really Insignificant, Predictable, and Rational?, 26 J. Legal Stud. 663
(1997).
In their careful analysis, Eisenberg et al. show that the logarithmic
transformation yields a distribution that is almost normal. They also show
that the log of awards is predicted rather well from a set of objective
characteristics of cases in which such awards were made. Eisenberg et al.
conclude that the unpredictability of punitive awards has been overstated.
We find no inconsistency between their analyses of real jury awards and
our experimental data. Indeed, we agree with their conclusion that log
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Our principal interest here is in identifying some of the
sources of unpredictability in jury judgments. On the basis of a
study of 899 jury-eligible citizens, we offer the following major
findings.
1. People have a remarkably high degree of moral
consensus on the degree of outrage and punishment that are
appropriate for punitive damage cases.29 At least in the
products liability cases we offer, this moral consensus, on
what might be called outrage and punitive intent, cuts across
differences in gender, race, income, age, and education. For
example, our study shows that all-white, all-female, all-
Hispanic, all-male, all-poor, all-wealthy, all-black juries, all-old
juries, and all-young juries are likely to come to similar
conclusions about how to rank a range of cases.
2. This consensus fractures when the legal system uses
dollars as the vehicle to measure moral outrage. Even when
there is a consensus on punitive intent, there is no consensus
about how much in the way of dollars is necessary to produce
appropriate suffering in a defendant. Under existing law,
widely shared and reasonably predictable judgments about
                                                                                                   
awards are fairly predictable. But defendants and plaintiffs live in a world
of dollars, not of log dollars. In terms of dollars the judgments of our
respondents and of the juries examined by Eisenberg et al. are correctly
described as erratic and unpredictable, because the severe skewness
creates the possibility of either modest or disastrous losses in identical
cases. This produces unfairness, because the similarly situated are treated
differently, and also might induce risk aversion even in very large firms.
28 For relevant evidence see Paul H. Rubin et al., BMW v. Gore:
Mitigating the Punitive Economics of Punitive Damages, 5 Supreme Court
Economic Review 179, 192-96 (1997); Richard L. Manning, Products
Liability and Prescription Drug Prices in Canada and the United States, 40
J. L. & Economics 203, 210-34 (1997).
29 Two qualifications are necessary. First, this conclusion is restricted
to the area we investigate, involving products liability suits. It is an open
question whether the moral consensus would operate in areas involving,
for example, sexual harassment and discrimination on the basis of race.
Second, there is a greater consensus on how to rank the scenarios than on
the “absolute” numbers for outrage and punishment. See below.
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punitive intent are turned into highly erratic judgments about
appropriate dollar punishment. A basic source of arbitrariness
with the existing system of punitive damages (and a problem
not limited to the area of punitive damages) is the use of an
unbounded dollar scale.
3. A modest degree of additional arbitrariness is created
by the fact that juries have a hard time making appropriate
distinctions among cases in what we call “a no-comparison
condition.” When one case is seen apart from other cases,
people show a general tendency to place it toward the
midpoint of any bounded scale. It is therefore less likely that
sensible discriminations will be made among diverse cases.
This effect is, however, far less important than the effect
identified in (2) in producing arbitrary awards.
The principal purpose of this Article is to set out and to
elaborate these findings and to use them to develop some
policy reforms in the area of punitive damages. Our basic
suggestion is that the legal system should enable juries to
engage in tasks that they are capable of performing, and
should not require juries to carry out tasks that they cannot
perform well. Juries are likely to produce erratic judgments
about dollar amounts; their judgments are likely to be much
less erratic when they are asked to rank cases or to assess
the degree to which a defendant should be punished on a
bounded rating scale.30 Thus there is reason to ask whether
the civil justice system ought not to be brought more closely in
line with the criminal justice system, where juries of course
decide questions of liability, and judges decide questions
                                                                                                   
30 Of course there is a large question about the importance of
predictability in an assessment of punitive damage awards. Such awards
may be predictable but nonetheless problematic, because (for example)
they are too high or too low to produce optimal deterrence, or they do not
reflect the right theory of retribution. Our focus here is on the problem of
unpredictability, which is an affront to the rule of law and a particular
problem under the due process clause and associated principles. See TAN
infra. But we discuss below the relationship between unpredictability and
other possible problems with damage awards.
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about punishment, subject to guidelines and constraints. If
juries cannot consistently or sensibly “map” their judgments
onto an unbounded dollar scale, might it follow that judges,
rather than juries, should be making decisions about punitive
awards? Should the legal system shift to a system of civil
sentencing? Might the same conclusion make sense for
compensatory awards in cases in which dollar awards are
also likely to be arbitrary? Might the current system of civil
liability, both punitive and compensatory, sometimes be
displaced by an administrative process, one that can aspire to
more in the way of coherence and rationality?
The choice of reform of course depends on an assessment
of precisely what defects ought to be corrected, and thus on a
set of normative judgments about the problems with punitive
awards in their current form. We attempt to disaggregate
three possible judgments here, partly as thought experiments,
and partly to raise some questions about the appropriate
domain of populist elements in the legal system.
If the basic problem is simple unpredictability, the legal
system might reduce that problem by asking juries not to
come up with dollar amounts, but to rank the case at hand
among a preselected set of exemplar cases, or by using a
bounded scale of numbers rather than an unbounded scale of
dollars. A conversion formula, based on previously compiled
population-wide data, might be used to generate population-
wide judgments about dollar amounts. Through this route, it
would be possible to reduce variability and to ensure that jury
judgments about appropriate dollar punishments do not reflect
the likely unrepresentative views of twelve randomly selected
people, but those of the population as a whole. The result
would be a form of predictable populism.
If the basic problem is that people cannot sensibly map
their moral judgments onto dollar awards, the legal system
should provide a mechanism by which judges or
administrators, rather than jurors, can translate the relevant
moral judgments into dollar amounts. It is reasonable to
question whether ordinary people can know what a given
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dollar amount would mean for, or do to, the defendant or
those in the position of the defendant. On this view, the jury
should also rank the case at hand in comparison to
preselected cases or come up with a number on a bounded
scale. A conversion formula, based not on population-wide
data but on expert judgments about what various awards
would actually mean or do, would be used to produce rational
judgments about dollar amounts. The result would be a form
of technocratic populism— populist in the sense that normative
judgments of the jury would be the foundation of decision,
technocratic in the sense that experts would translate those
judgments into legal awards.
If the basic problem is that people’s moral judgments are
not the proper basis for punitive awards, judges might, in
some or all contexts, use those moral judgments as one factor
to be considered among others, or the legal system might
dispense with jury judgments entirely in some or all contexts.
If, for example, it is believed that existing social norms are not
the appropriate basis for punishment, or if deterrence rather
than retribution is the appropriate goal of punitive damages,
an expert body might decide on appropriate awards, or it
could offer general guidance to trial court judges. The result
would be a form of bureaucratic rationality.
We discuss these points in some detail. We also compare
these reform proposals with other alternatives, including
punitive damage “caps,” simple multipliers, greater judicial
control of awards, and monetary schedules building on the
workers’ compensation model. We suggest that caps and
multipliers have serious problems, but that firmer judicial
control would likely be a desirable and easily administrable
step, at least if judges can produce or work from monetary
schedules or otherwise attempt to work from comparison
cases. A more radical reform, with much promise but also
some risk, would involve a shift from juries to administrators,
operating from a set of guidelines produced by specialists in
the areas at hand, subject of course to democratic
safeguards.
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Both the empirical findings and the policy
recommendations have implications well beyond the problem
of punitive damages. The problem of “mapping” onto a dollar
scale arises not only in the setting of punitive damages, but
also in damages for “pain and suffering,” libel actions, sexual
harassment cases, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
administrative penalties, and judgments about the appropriate
focus of the regulatory state. About one-half of tort law
involves monetary awards for injuries that are hard to
monetize.31 From our findings, it is reasonable to infer that the
phenomenon of shared judgments and erratic or arbitrary32
dollar amounts create a serious and unaddressed problem in
many areas.  Very typically, juries and judge are mapping
judgments onto an unbounded dollar scale; the phenomenon
of widespread and predictable judgments, combined with the
demonstrable cognitive difficulty of translating preferences
and values into dollar amounts, has wide-ranging implications
for the operation of both private and public law.
Most generally, our findings raise a simple question: How
can the normative goals of the legal system be made to mesh
with what is, or might be, known about human psychology?
This is a large and unanswered question. We attempt to make
some progress on it here.
This Article comes in six parts. Part II outlines existing
understandings about punitive damages, showing how the
sources of variable judgments are relevant to constitutional
issues and also to existing theories of deterrence and
retribution. Part III outlines our study and the basic
conclusions. Part IV presents policy recommendations
designed to provide a role for community judgments without
the “noise” and arbitrariness that accompany the current
system. What is important is not the details of the proposals
                                                                                                   
31 See W. Kip Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability 102-104 (1993).
32 They may be arbitrary either in the sense of erratic or in the sense
of a product of a normatively questionable “anchor” on which the jury has
seized. See TAN infra.
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but their basic goal and direction: to provide juries with an
opportunity to do what they are capable of doing relatively
well, without requiring juries to do what they are bound to do
badly.
Part V briefly discusses some analogies and implications,
dealing above all with the general problem of jury
determination of dollar amounts in contexts in which
monetization is unfamiliar and difficult. We show how an
evaluation of appropriate reforms with respect to
compensatory awards call for an ambitious decision about
role of populist and technocratic ingredients of
“compensation” judgments— or, in other words, a decision
about what the vexing idea of “compensation” should be taken
to mean. We also outline a possible research agenda to see
how actual or potential descriptive findings in psychology
might bear on the normative goals of the legal system. Part VI
is a conclusion.
II. DETERRENCE, RETRIBUTION, AND THE CONSTITUTION
A. Policy Notes
It is not our purpose to resolve the debate about whether
and why a court should award punitive damages.33 Our
modest goal is to outline some of the relevant arguments by
way of introduction. It is important to provide those arguments
here, since they provide the foundation for the constitutional
law governing punitive damage awards, and because the
arguments play a large role in our empirical study.
                                                                                                   
33 Relevant discussions include Polinsky and Shavell, supra note;
Dorsey Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56
Southern Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1982); Robert Cooter, Economic Analysis of
Punitive Damages, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 79 (1982); Robert Cooter, Punitive
Damages for Deterrence, 40 Alabama L. Rev. 1143 (1989); David Owen,
The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages, 40 Ala. L. Rev. 705 (1989);
Marc Galanter and David Luban, Poetic Justice, 42 Am. L. Rev. 1393
(1993).
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The traditional view is that punitive awards serve deterrent
and retributive goals. Thus a standard jury instruction says,
“In determining whether or not you should award punitive
damages, you should bear in mind that the purpose of such
an award is to punish the wrongdoer and to deter that
wrongdoer from repeating such wrongful acts. In addition,
such damages are also designed to serve as a warning to
others, and to prevent others from committing such wrongful
acts.”34
1. Deterrence
(a) Conventional arguments. With respect to the goal of
deterrence, there is a simple and standard economic
argument for punitive damages: Compensatory damages work
well for deterrence if and only if it is easy to identify and to
bring suit against the injurer, and to collect full damages.
Under these conditions, the wrongdoer faces liability for the
full social costs of the wrong. Thus there is no need for
additional damages if the probability of detection and
successful suit for compensation is 100%. But sometimes it is
difficult to identify the injurer, perhaps because the tort has
occurred surreptitiously. In such cases, adequate deterrence
will not be provided, since wrongdoers will be able to continue
to engage in conduct whose social costs exceed social
benefits. Punitive damages are necessary to pick up the slack
for undetected wrongdoers.35
Under this view, the goal of punitive damages is to
ensure that the award of compensatory damages is
supplemented by an amount reflecting the fact that the
probability of that award is less than 100%. The simplest
conclusion is that total damages should be the harm
multiplied by the reciprocal of the probability than the
                                                                                                   
34 Ronald Eades, Jury Instructions of Damages in Tort Actions 98 (3d
ed. 1995).
35 See William Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic
Structure of Tort Law 160-65 (1987); Polinsky & Shavell, Punitive
Damages: An Economic Analysis, Harv L. Rev, forthcoming.
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defendant will be found liable when he should be found
liable; punitive damages would then consist of the excess of
total damages over compensatory damages.36 We will
suggest some institutional and psychological reasons to
doubt that jurors can or will make judgments of this kind; let
us continue the simple account for now.
With some torts— medical malpractice is an obvious
example— it is very plausibly the case that many defendants
will be able to avoid compensatory damages. When the
defendant has been able to conceal his identity, or otherwise
to escape being sued, there is therefore good reason to
award punitive damages. Interestingly, this analysis supports
a relatively high punitive damages award in the BMW case
(discussed below), because it is not easy to detect fraudulent
repaintings of cars. But in cases in which the probability of
detection and suit is extremely high, punitive damages make
far less sense. This may be true, for example, of certain
homicides and assaults.
From the standpoint of optimal deterrence, there is a
second possible reason to award punitive damages. There
may be cases in which a social judgment has been, and
should be, made that certain subjective gains ought not to be
allowed to count at all.37 If someone has gained utility from
murder, rape, assault, or sexual harassment, it might be
thought— reasonably enough— that that gain should not be
permitted to count. Of course the argument that such gains
should not count is not itself an economic judgment, but it is
not hard to imagine defenses of that argument.38 Punitive
damages are necessary to offset the utility gain that is judged
illicit. Compensatory damages are inadequate, in such cases,
                                                                                                   
36 See Polinsky & Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis,
Harv. L. Rev., forthcoming.
37 Some utilitarians make just this argument. See the discussion of the
exclusion of sadistic or malicious preferences in John Harsanyi, Morality
and the Theory of Rational Behavior, in Utilitarianism and Beyond 39
(Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams eds. 1982)
38 See id.
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because they do not have this effect; they require the
defendant to internalize the victim’s costs without also
eliminating the hedonic effects of the defendant’s benefits.
A third possible reason for punitive damages stems from
the fact that sometimes compensatory damages may be lower
than they should be, and sometimes it is especially costly for
courts to calculate compensatory damages. If compensatory
awards are systematically low, and if calculation costs are
high, the amount awarded for punitive damages may move
the legal system closer to optimal deterrence.39 Of course this
argument has a degree of speculativeness and also
crudeness, because it is unlikely that punitive damages can
be calibrated with sufficient precision to make up for the
shortfall in compensatory damages. But perhaps it is
reasonable to think that punitive damages bring the incentives
of wrongdoers closer to where they should be.
On this view, intentional torts, involving deliberate infliction
of an injury, may well provide good cases for punitive
damages. Of course it is in such cases that socially illicit
gains are most likely to be involved. In such cases, the
probability of obtaining damages from the injurer may well be
less than 100%; intentional torts frequently (though not
always) involve a form of concealment. But an important
implication is that punitive damages generally do not make
sense for highly visible torts where the probability of detection
and compensation is extremely high; there, compensatory
damages are all that is required.40
(b) Puzzles and problems. Even from the economic point
of view, these arguments for punitive damages raise some
serious puzzles. An important question, not yet taken up in
the economic literature, is the relation between this rationale
for punitive damages and the existence of other regulatory
controls, for example those created by administrative and
criminal law. Both administrative and criminal law are often
                                                                                                   
39 See Landes and Posner, supra note, at 160.
40 See id.; Polinsky and Shavell, supra note.
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defended as an effort to compensate for private
underenforcement of law;41 if the tort system also attempts to
pick up the slack via punitive damages, overdeterrence may
well result. A system containing compensatory and punitive
damages may be both necessary and sufficient taken by
itself, but if it is complemented by administrative and criminal
law, it is likely to become incoherent.
There is an independent point, closely related to our
findings here. Even without administrative and criminal law,
efforts to impose punitive damages may well misfire because
of the inevitable confusion or cognitive and motivational errors
of jurors and judges. There is thus a question whether real-
world institutions should or can reliably engage in the
enterprise of seeking to obtain optimal deterrence even if they
seek to do so. That enterprise is very costly, and the costs of
decision may argue in favor of some other system for
calculating punitive damages. Perhaps juries will not
understand the inquiry into optimal deterrence; perhaps it will
be too costly to give them the relevant understanding;
perhaps they will refuse to undertake that inquiry even if they
are asked to do so. We return to these issues below.
A general problem is that if juries are not thinking in
economic terms, they may award large punitive damages in a
way that deters desirable activity (or award small punitive
damages in a way that produces insufficient deterrence). With
large awards, activity that produces benefits as well as costs
may be stopped or significantly reduced, with possible
adverse effects on safety and health itself.42 It is for this
                                                                                                   
41 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 220 (4th
ed. 1994). A general discussion is Edward Rubin, Punitive Damages:
Reconceptualizing the Runcible Remedies of Common Law, Wisconsin
Law Review (forthcoming 1997).
42 Thus there is a possibility here of health-health tradeoffs, which
occur when a strategy designed to reduce health risks actually increases
health risks. Some punitive damage awards may actually have adverse
health effects, if they serve to increase prices. For a recent discussion,
see Richard L. Manning, Products Liability and Prescription Drug Prices in
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reason that the strongest cases involve intentional torts, and
the weakest case involves negligence. In cases involving
negligence, punitive damages would be likely to reduce
desirable activity. This is much less likely for intentional
wrongdoing, where desirable activity by hypothesis is not at
issue. Reckless behavior is of course an intermediate case.
For those interested in optimal deterrence, a particularly
important dispute is whether, on economic grounds, the
wealth or income of the defendant should matter.43 As we will
explain, our findings suggest that the defendant’s wealth is
likely to be an important variable in actual damage awards,
though it plays little or no role in people’s judgments about
outrageousness or appropriate punishment on a bounded
numerical scale.44 The Supreme Court has said that wealth
and income can be taken into account.45 On a conventional
view about optimal deterrence, however, wealth and income is
irrelevant. Properly calculated by reference to the probability
of punishment and the need to counteract illicit gains, a
punitive damages award should encourage a defendant to
                                                                                                   
Canada and the United States, 40 J. L. & Economics 203, 210-34 (1997).
For general discussion, see John Graham and Jonathan Weiner, Risk vs.
Risk (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1533 (1996). Evidence of such effects, in the particular context of
punitive damages, can be found in Paul Rubin, John Calfee, and Mark
Grady, BMW v. Gore: Mitigating the Punitive Economics of Punitive
Damages, 1997 Supreme Court Review 179, 192-96.
43 For the view that wealth should be irrelevant, see Kemezy v.
Peters, 79 F.3d 22 (7th Cir. 1996); Kenneth Abraham and John Jeffries,
Punitive Damages and the Rule of Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 415 (1989);
Ellis, supra note, at 61-63; Polinsky and Shavell, supra note. For an
argment the other way, see Jennifer Arlen, Should Defendants’ Wealth
Matter?, 21 J. Legal Stud. 413, 414 (1992) (discussing deterrence of risk-
averse people).
44 See TAN supra. Compare  Robert MacCoun, infra note 45.
45 See infra. Cf. Robert MacCoun, Differential Treatment of Corporate
Defendants by Juries, 30 Law & Society Review 121, 133-39 (1996)
(finding effects from corporate identity and commercial activity, but not
from wealth per se).
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engage in optimal behavior, whatever its wealth (assuming
risk neutrality).46 But there is a question whether this is
realistic; we take up this issue below.
2. Retribution
Thus far we have spoken in terms of deterrence; but under
conventional noneconomic analysis, punitive damages also
have an expressive or retributive purpose. They are designed
to punish as well as to deter. Juries believe that such awards
express the community’s outrage at certain forms of behavior,
and judges’ instructions encourage juries to think in precisely
these terms. In fact empirical evidence, including that
provided here,47 suggests that juries are not attempting to
promote optimal deterrence but instead to punish wrongdoing
with, at most, a signal designed to ensure that certain
misconduct “will not happen again.”
Regrettably, the legal culture lacks a careful normative
account of the relationship between retributive goals and
punitive damages. Those who emphasize retribution are
seeking to ensure that the community’s outrage about certain
acts is reflected in punishment. Probably the retributive idea
would focus on two principal factors: the defendant’s state of
mind and the degree of harm actually caused or likely to be
caused by defendant’s behavior. The first point is especially
important. Retributists who are moral egalitarians48 attempt,
through civil or criminal punishment, to capture the intuition
that certain intentional states are especially bad because they
reflect abhorrent and false views about the moral worth of
persons.49 In cases where one person murders another, or
                                                                                                   
46 See Landes and Posner, supra note, at 163-64; Polinsky and
Shavell, supra note.
47 See TAN infra.
48 Of course retributivists need not be egalitarians; we could imagine
retributists who thought that harms against some persons deserve less
punishment than harms against other persons.
49 See Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in Jean Hampton and
Jeffrie Murphy, Forgiveness and Mercy 111 (1988).
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acts with gross negligence that produces another’s death, the
wrongdoer reveals a belief that some people do not matter
very much.50 Public outrage is the appropriate response.
In this sense retribution, properly understood, embodies a
principle of moral equality. The award of punitive damages
can also be taken to have an expressive function; it expresses
the community’s outrage at certain kinds of conduct, in a way
that is intended both to reflect and to entrench the relevant
social norms. This idea connects the award of punitive
damages with their historical origins in affronts to the honor of
the victims.51 With this understanding it is not surprising that
punitive damages have come to be awarded for sexual
harassment and for other violations of civil rights statutes;52
the relevant community now believes that these kinds of
illegality reflect an especially bad state of mind, and hence
that punitive damages are a necessary supplement to other
sanctions. The defendant must be punished accordingly. In
any event the retributive idea suggests that the most serious
cases for punitive damage awards thus involve harms that are
both grave in degree and affirmatively desired by the
defendant, as, for example, in examples of homicide or
assault.
We connect these factors to the psychology of punitive
damage awards in the discussion below. The central point is
that if retribution is the goal of punitive damage awards, it is
important to ensure that juries are asked questions that allow
them to express, in a rational and coherent manner, their
                                                                                                   
50 See id.; Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs:
The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L Rev 1659 (1992). Hampton discusses
punitive damage awards in particular in id. at 1687-89; see also the
illuminating discussion in Marc Galanter and David Luban, Poetic Justice:
Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 Am Univ L Rev 1393 (1993)
(connecting punitive awards with retributive goals and community
outrage).
51 See Dorsey Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive
Damages, 56 S Cal L Rev 2, 14-15 (1982).
52 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 1977A.
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sense of outrage and their judgments about appropriate
punishment. The question then becomes whether dollar
amounts are a sensible register of that sense and those
judgments.
B. The Constitution and Punitive Damages
1. Options
What is the relationship between the award of punitive
damages and the Constitution? Because punitive damage
awards have been so controversial, and because the
Supreme Court has been effectively forced to evaluate a
range of punitive damage judgments, this question has
become one of the more complex and pressing in modern
constitutional law. There are three possible answers: (a)
Punitive damages awards are always constitutional. (b) Such
awards are unconstitutional, as violations of the due process
clause in its substantive dimension, when they are “grossly
excessive.” (c) Such awards are unconstitutional, as
violations of the due process clause in its procedural
dimension, when they are too likely to be arbitrary, because,
for example, they are unaccompanied by procedures that
sufficiently confine the discretion of the jury. Our findings here
are directed principally toward proposition (c) and to the
general question whether, why, and in what sense punitive
damage awards are likely to be unpredictable and arbitrary.
The constitutional judgment overlaps with the more mundane
work of district judges and appellate courts, which set aside
many punitive awards (as high as 20%) as arbitrary because
out of step with the facts of the case or with comparison
cases.53
A majority of the Supreme Court has recently converged
on proposition (b), though propositions (a) and (c) have also
received significant support, and though (c) is highly likely to
be a prime area for future contestation.54 In fact the majority’s
                                                                                                   
53 See cases cited in notes infra.
54 BMW of North America v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
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endorsement of a version of (b) is accompanied by an
understanding that a major problem with excessive awards is
that they fail to provide sufficient predictability.55 Hence a
majority of recent justices— most prominently Justices
O’Connor and Breyer, but at different times also Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Souter, White, Brennan, Marshall,
Stevens, Kennedy, and Blackmun— have argued that the due
process clause requires constraints on jury discretion that will
provide fair notice and limit the role of arbitrary or irrelevant
factors. The Court has not given much of an account of how
juries might be led in the direction of arbitrariness or
unpredictability; our findings offer the elements of such an
account, one that attempts to specify and model some of the
concerns voiced by Justices O’Connor and Breyer.
In a series of early cases the Court refused to set aside
punitive damage awards as inconsistent with the excessive
fines and due process clauses.56 But it left open the possibility
that in an extreme case, an award would be constitutionally
unacceptable under the due process clause. Thus the
punitive damages decisions have refused to endorse the rule,
proposed most insistently by Justice Scalia,57 that the
Constitution imposes no constraints on what juries may do in
this context. Instead the Court left open the possibility of a
substantive due process limitation on excessive awards. The
Court stressed the possibility of a successful claims on the
basis of substantive rather than procedural due process
insofar as the Court emphasized that the problem would arise
if the relevant award was unjustifiably large or “excessive”—
rather than if the procedure that produced those awards was
unreliable. There is a clear parallel here to capital
punishment, where there is a similar judgment to be made
                                                                                                   
55 Id. at 1604; id at 1605-07 (Breyer, J., concurring).
56 TXO Producton v. Alliance, 509 US 443 (1993); Pacific Mutual v.
Haslip, 499 US 1 (1991).
57 See BMW of North America v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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about whether the problem with the death penalty is that it is
sometimes or always excessive or instead that it is produced
by insufficiently reliable procedures. After seriously
considering both routes, the Court eventually converged on
the procedural option, and it is possible that this will happen
with punitive damage awards as well. And as we will see, the
choice of substantive rather than procedural due process is of
great importance; empirical evidence suggests some
advantages to the procedural route.
2. Repainted cars
For constitutional purposes, the key case is BMW of North
America v. Gore.58 In that case, Dr. Gore sought punitive
damages because his new BMW had actually been repainted,
and he was not informed of this fact. The jury granted an
award of punitive damages of four million dollars, an amount
that seemed well out of line with the $4000 compensatory
damages award. Presented by this disparity, the Court ruled
for the first time that an award of punitive damages violates
the due process clause. But there was an internal division.
The opinion for the five-member majority spoke in terms of
excessiveness and hence substantive due process,59 though
with subthemes of federalism and fair notice. Justice Breyer’s
concurring opinion was procedurally oriented.60 The four
dissenting justices seemed to say that no punitive damage
award could ever violate the due process clause;61 part of the
impetus for their opinion was to impose good incentives on
democratic branches to take care of the problem.62 It is
worthwhile to spend some time with the opinions, to show
                                                                                                   
58 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
59 Id. at 1598-1604.
60 Id. at 1605-09.
61 Id. at 1610-1614 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at
1614-1618 (Ginsburg, J., joined by the Chief Justice, dissenting).
62 Compare the idea of a penalty default in the law of contracts and
statutory construction. See note supra; see also Ian Ayres and Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts, 99 Yale LJ 87 (1989).
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where our findings about jury judgments connect with existing
law.
In finding the award grossly excessive, the Court began
with the suggestion that a state may not impose sanctions on
law-violators with the goal of changing the violators’ lawful
conduct in other states. The Court made clear that a state
may not attempt to change a company’s policies in other
states if those policies are not unlawful in those other states;
and though it left some ambiguity on this point, it suggested
that a state may impose punitive damages only in order to
protect its own consumers and its own economy. In a crucial
passage, the Court also said that the due process clause
requires not merely fair notice of what is criminal but also fair
notice “of the severity of the penalty that a State may
impose.”63 In finding that BMW did not receive adequate
notice of the magnitude of the sanction that Alabama might
impose, the Court referred to three “guideposts”:64 the degree
of reprehensibility of the nondisclosure; the relation between
harm and potential harm on the one hand and the punitive
damages award on the other; and the difference between the
punitive award and available penalties for comparable
misconduct. Taking these guideposts together, the Court
found the award unconstitutional because “grossly
excessive.”
The first factor, in the Court’s view, is an effort to ensure
some proportionality, in which damages reflect the extent of
the offense.65 Here retributive goals appear central. In the
Court’s view, this was a serious problem with the jury’s award,
because no special aggravating considerations were present
in Gore’s case. The injury was purely economic. There was no
effect on performance or safety of the car, or even its
appearance for a significant period. There was no indifference
to or reckless disregard for health and safety. The failure to
                                                                                                   
63 116 S. Ct. at 1598.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 1599.
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disclose the relevant material was very plausibly a wrong,
especially insofar as it formed part of a national pattern, but it
was not a matter of outrageous behavior, deliberate false
statements, concealment of evidence of improper motive, or
affirmative misconduct.66
In discussing the second factor, the Court said that the
ratio of punitive damages to actual (or potential)
compensatory damages was especially bad: over 500 to 1.
This was worse than that in previous cases.67 Importantly, the
Court did not say that the ratio would be decisive. If an
especially egregious act produced a small amount of
economic damage, high punitive damages would be
legitimate; so too where “the injury is hard to detect or the
monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been
difficult to determine.”68 But 500 to 1 is “breathtaking.”69
Third, the civil and criminal penalties that could be
imposed for comparable misconduct were far more limited,
involving, for example, a maximum civil penalty for deceptive
trade practices of $2000.70 Thus the punitive damage award
was quite inconsistent with legislative judgments about the
relevant conduct as seen in other areas of the law. The point
matters as a means of checking jury determinations against
the assessments of democratically elected legislatures.
In a concurring opinion joined by Justices O’Connor and
Souter, Justice Breyer pressed some different points, drawing
on the basic principle of fair notice.71 For Justice Breyer, the
most serious problem in the case was not sheer
excessiveness but the absence of legal standards that could
                                                                                                   
66 Id. at 1601.
67 Id. at 1601. Compare the Haslip case, involving a ratio of over 4 to
1, Pacific Mutual Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 US 1 (1991), and also that
in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 US 443 (1993),
involving a ratio of 10 to 1.
68 Id. at 1602.
69 Id. at 1603.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 1605.
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reduce decisionmaker discretion and hence caprice. The
central problem, for Justice Breyer, was unlimited jury
discretion. Here the relevant standards “are vague and open-
ended to the point where they risk arbitrary results.”72 The jury
operated under no statute with standards distinguishing
among permissible punitive damage awards. In the Green Oil
case,73 decided in 1989, Alabama set out seven factors to be
used by appellate courts to constrain punitive damages
awards. These included: a reasonable relation to actual and
likely harm; degree of reprehensibility; removal of profit; the
financial position of the defendant; costs of litigation and need
to create incentives for private litigants; the imposition, or not,
of criminal sanctions on the defendant; and the existence of
mitigation from other civil penalties.74 In this case, however,
the seven factors were not applied in a way that made for
actual constraint. Nor have the state courts made any effort to
discipline those factors in such a way as to generate a legally
constraining standard. In so saying, Justice Breyer referred to
the economic test referred to above, in particular to the
possibility of permitting “juries to calculate punitive damages
by making a rough estimate of global harm, dividing that
estimate by a similarly rough estimate of the number of
lawsuits that would likely be brought, and adding generous
attorneys frees and other costs.”75 Here there was no
evidence that the Alabama Supreme Court applied “any
economic theory” to explain the $2 million recovery.76 Nor was
there a community understanding or historic practice that
would provide background standards exemplified in that
recovery. The general problem lay in the violation of the Rule
                                                                                                   
72 Id. at 1608.
73 Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218 (Ala. 1989).
74 Id. at 223.
75 116 S. Ct. at 1607.
76 Id.
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of Law. “The upshot is that the rules that purport to channel
discretion in this kind of case, here did not do so in fact.”77
Thus Justice Breyer’s opinion can be understood as
connecting the outcome in BMW with void for vagueness
cases78 and the constitutional attack on the death penalty in
Furman v. Georgia.79 The central problem lies in
unconstrained discretion. For Justice Breyer, the outcome in
the BMW case is not best understood simply by reference to
excessiveness. We will refer to Justice Breyer’s approach in a
number of places below. The problems identified here
connect directly with his procedural concerns; but they also
suggest a distinctive source of discretion, one very different
from that emphasized in his opinion. 80
                                                                                                   
77 Id. at 1609.
78 See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 US 156 (1972).
79 408 US 238 (1972).
80 Two other cases should be briefly discussed. In Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 US 1 (1991), Haslip complained of the
lapsing of his health insurance policy as a result of misconduct by one
Ruffin, an agent for Pacific Mutual and also for another, unaffiliated
company. Ruffin had misappropriated premiums issued by Haslip’s
employer for payment to the other insurer. The trial court instructed the
jury that it could award punitive damages against Pacific Mutual if it found
liability for fraud. The jury awarded a general verdict of $1,040,000, with a
likely division of $200,000 for compensatory damages and $840,000 for
punitive damages. The Court held that the award was acceptable: the
instructions referred to deterrent and redistributive goals, pointed to the
character and degree of the wrong, and excluded evidence of Pacific
Mutual’s wealth; the Supreme Court of Alabama had established post-trial
procedures for scrutinizing punitive damage awards; and that Supreme
Court provided an additional check by examining whether there is a
reasonable relation between the award the actual and likely harm, the
degree and duration of the defendant’s conduct, the defendant’s state of
mind, any concealment by the defendant, and the frequency of past
similar conduct; the profitability to the defendant; and other factors. Id. at
17-20.
The Court was badly divided over the damage award in TXO
Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993). TXO
had been held liable for $19,000 in actual damages as a result of having
slandered Alliance’s title; the jury also awarded $10 million in punitive
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C. Valuation, Variability, and Constraints
After BMW, and the unruly precedents on which it is
based, the law governing constitutional constraints on
punitive damage awards is in a state of considerable
uncertainty and flux.81 It is clear that due process questions
are raised by any awards that are unaccompanied by
limitations on jury discretion and that exhibit striking ratios
between punitive damages and compensatory damages (of,
say, 10 to 1 or more). It is equally clear that striking ratios are
not (and should not be) decisive, that a jury is entitled to
consider the wealth of the defendant, and that a plaintiff might
be able to eliminate constitutional doubts by showing, for
example, that the likely harm was higher than the actual harm,
that the defendant engaged in a long course of misconduct, or
that the defendant’s state of mind was especially bad. And in
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,82 the Court held, in a way that
bears a good deal on our study, that the due process clause
requires judicial review of the size of punitive damage awards,
to ensure that they are not arbitrary or excessive. The Court
said that a state that failed to provide judicial review violated
                                                                                                   
damages. The Court upheld the award. Justice Stevens, writing as well for
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun, wrote the plurality opinion,
holding that the TXO award was not excessive merely because the
potential harm was much higher than the actual harm. Id. at 459-62. If
TXO had succeeded, it could have produced a multimillion dollar reduction
in its own royalty obligations to Alliance, and Alliance could have suffered
a multimillion dollar loss. Id. at 462. In any case TXO’s pattern of behavior
threatened millions of dollars in losses to others. Id. Thus there was no
grotesque disparity between punitive damages and threatened harm. In a
lengthy dissenting opinion, Justice O’Connor, mostly joined by Justices
White and Souter, complained about the procedures underlying the $10
million award, which, in her view, raised a serious risk of arbitrariness. Id.
at 474.
81 See, e.g., Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 1997 US App LEXIS 22511
(1997); Mathie v. Fries, 1997 US App LEXIS 19874 (2d Cir. 1997).
82 512 U.S. 415 ((1994).
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procedural due process, because it risked a “lawless, biased,
or arbitrary” result.83
But all this leaves many open questions. It is hardly certain
that the Court will embark on the project of creating a detailed
form of constitutional “common law” to control punitive
damages. But the BMW case practically forces lower courts to
begin to do exactly that, and this is what is now emerging.84
What the Court lacks, and what bears on constitutional
controls, is an understanding of the source of jury variability.
Where jurors’ judgments range over a wide range, what is the
reason? Are jurors reacting to fine-grained judgments about
particular cases? What is the source of unpredictable or
erratic judgments? What strategies might work, or fail to work,
in counteracting the problem? These are the questions on
which we will try to make some progress here.
The answers do not bear only on constitutional law. As a
practical matter, nonconstitutional law is far more important as
a means of controlling punitive damage awards. What are the
standards for judicial review of punitive awards? Appellate
courts, admittedly with constitutional pressure in the
background, are often in the business of deciding whether to
reduce punitive damage awards as unreasonable.85 In fact a
significant percentage of punitive awards do not survive
appellate review.86 To decide when to reduce awards,
                                                                                                   
83 Id. at 433.
84 Id.
85 Klein v. Grynberg, 44 F. 3d 1497 (10th Cir. 1995); Stafford v. Puro,
63 F.3d 1436 (7th Cir. 1995): Allahar v. Zahora, 59 F.3d 693 (7th Cir.
1995): Ross v. Black and Decker, Inc., 977 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir. 1992):
Vasbinder v. Scott, 976 F.2d 118 (2nd Cir. 1992); Kimzey v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568 (8th Cir. 1997): Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805
(2nd Cir. 1996): King v. Macri, 993 F.2d 294 (2nd Cir. 1993): Michelson v.
Hamada, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 343 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994): Wollersheim v. Church
of Scientology, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992): Baume v. 212 E.
10 N.Y. Bar Ltd., 634 N.Y.S. 2d 478 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Parkin v.
Cornell University Inc., 581 N.Y.S.2d 914 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992):
86 See David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury
Damages Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittur
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appellate judges need some understanding of what makes
awards unreasonable, and hence an understanding of the
sources of variability. Trial courts are in a similar position,
both in offering instructions and in reducing awards after they
have been made. It is predictable that even when the due
process clause is not at issue, both trial courts and appellate
courts will struggle with questions very much like those raised
in BMW as they continue to devise principles by which to
constrain awards. The governing principles have yet to be
well-settled and clear standards have yet to emerge. Indeed,
it is not at all clear why the legal system should not generally
contain a mechanism for increasing punitive damage awards
when a particular jury has imposed an unduly low award87— a
question to which we will return. If variable and erratic
judgments are the problem, the legal system should correct
awards that are both unreasonably low and unreasonably
high, for both of these are likely to occur.88
Of course the whole question of punitive damages is under
active consideration in many states as well as at the national
level.89 States are considering caps in the form of ratios or flat
                                                                                                   
Review of Awards For Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80
Iowa L. Rev. 1109, 1120 n. 20 (1995).
87 There is in some states a procedure for “additur,” see David Baldus
et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages Assessments: A
Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittur Review of Awards For
Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 1109, 1119-
1120 (1995), but this procedure is used infrequently in punitive damages
cases, see id., and not at all in the federal courts, where the seventh
amendment right to a jury trial bans the use of additur, see Dimick v.
Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1934).
88 The best defense of the current system— allowing judges to reduce
or overturn awards that are too high, but not to increase awards that are
too low— is that populist enthusiasms might make juries too generous to
plaintiffs and too punitive to defendants; there is no fear, apparently, that
pro-defendant sentiments will lead in the opposite direction. Our study at
least suggests the possibility of problems in both directions, though it
provides particular evidence of “skewing” in the form of high rather than
low awards.
89 Three states do not allow punitive damages: Nebraska, New
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dollar limitations; many states are attempting to require
bifurcated trials in which judges rather than juries determine
the level of punitive damages.90 These are somewhat crude
and categorical efforts to respond to the general fear that
punitive damages are “out of control.”91 An understanding of
the source of variability would lead in the direction of more
finely tuned remedies, or at least toward a fuller sense of why
the crude alternatives would be acceptable. It is this fuller
sense that our study is designed to provide.
III. WHY PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS ARE ERRATIC
We designed a study to examine hypotheses about three
topics: (i) the psychology of the sequence of judgments and
                                                                                                   
Hampshire, and Washington. A number of states have special restrictions.
See Robert G. Schloerb et al., Punitive Damages: A Guide to the
Insurability of Punitive Damages in the United States 18-26 (1988).
Federal proposals include a cap on punitive damages in some civil suits,
see S. 5, 105th Cong, 1st Sess. (1997). H.R. 56, 104th Cong section 201
(1995).
90 State law reforms fall in several categories. See generally
Developments in the Law— The Civil Jury, 110 Harv L Rev 1408, 1527-
1536 (1997), for an overview. (1) Some states have enacted caps; other
states are considering that same approach. Some caps limit the entire
dollar amount; others limit punitive damage awards to a multiple of
compensatory damages; others relate possible punitive amounts to the
income of the defendant. (2) Some states requires part or all of the
punitive award to go to state agencies or the state treasury. See, e.g., Fla.
Stat. ch. 768.73/(2) (1995); Kan. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. 60-3402(e). (3)
Connecticut, Kansas, and Ohio have required the judge, not the jury, to
determine punitive damage awards. See Conn Gen State 52-240b; Kan
Civ Proc Code 60-3701(a); Ohio Rev Code Ann 2315.21. (4) Some states
have required a bifurcated trial, in a way that is designed to reduce
confusion and to make clear which factors are relevant to which
proceeding. (5) Over half the states have increased the standards of
proof, from preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing
evidence or more.
91 They are crude because no one believes that a simple ratio or flat
cap makes much sense except as an easily administrable effort to ensure
against the most outrageous awards. See below for more discussion.
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attitudes that produce individual judgments about punitive
awards in particular cases; (ii) the sources of variability in
these judgments; (iii) the implications of these findings for the
unpredictability of jury awards, and for possible reforms in the
tasks assigned to juries.
A total of 899 respondents were recruited from the voter
registration rolls of Travis County, Texas, and paid $35 to
participate in the study. A set of 10 vignettes of personal
injury cases were created in which a plaintiff (always an
individual customer) sued a firm for compensatory and
punitive damages. All vignettes had versions that differed in
the size of the defendant firm (medium or large). For four of
the vignettes, there were also versions that differed in the
harm that the plaintiff was said to have suffered, but not in the
description of the defendant’s actions. In total, there were 28
different variations of the 10 vignettes. Each respondent
evaluated 10 cases, composed of one variation of each of the
10 basic vignettes. The respondents were told to assume in
all cases that compensatory damages had been awarded in
the amount of $200,000, and that punitive damages were to
be considered. Three sub-samples were asked to answer
different questions about each scenario: how outrageous was
the defendant’s behavior (on a scale of 0 to 6); how much
should the defendant be punished (on a scale of 0 to 6); how
much should the defendant be required to pay in punitive
damages. Each respondent first dealt with one case without
seeing the others (the “no comparison” condition), then
received a booklet with nine new cases.
A. The Outrage Model
We propose a descriptive theory of the psychology of
punitive awards, called the outrage model.92 The essential
claim is that the moral transgressions of others evoke an
attitude of outrage, which combines an emotional evaluation
                                                                                                   
92 For further discussion see Kahneman, Schkade, and Sunstein,
supra note.
32 CHICAGO WORKING PAPER IN LAW AND ECONOMICS
and a response tendency. The rules that govern outrage
present an important problem that we do not address in this
paper.  We assume that outrage is largely governed by social
norms. Judged by reference to these norms, a particular
person's expressions of indignation may be deemed too
intense for its cause, or not intense enough.  Social as well as
legal norms also regulate the mapping from transgressions to
punishment.
An attitude is a mental state, and is not directly
observable. The various aspects of an attitude can, however,
be “mapped” onto diverse responses, which might include
facial expressions, verbal statements of opinion, gestures—
even physical assault.  Response “modes” might include a
judgment about the degree outrageousness on a numerical
scale. Under the outrage model, punitive damages are
considered an expression of an angry or indignant attitude
toward a transgressor. The evaluative aspect of the attitude is
labeled outrage; the response tendency is labeled punitive
intent. Outrage is basic, and punitive intent is measured by
outrage and additional factors, such as harm. As we will see,
the verbal indication of the desired severity of punishment
(punitive intent) is affected both by the outrage that an action
evokes and by the severity of its consequences (“harm”). This
retributive aspect of punishment is incorporated in many
aspects of the law, such as the large discrepancy between
sentences for murder and sentences for attempted murder.
The relationship between victim and juror was manipulated in
an experiment by Hastie, Schkade, and Payne.93  Under
experimental conditions, larger awards were made when the
plaintiff was located in the jurors' community than when the
plaintiff was from a remote location.  We speculate that this
factor affects punitive intent: the retributive urge is stronger
                                                                                                   
93 See Reid Haste, David Schkade, and John Payne (forthcoming).
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when the victim belongs to one's group than when the victim
is a stranger.94
In some situations the expression of an attitude is
restricted to a particular scale of responses. For example, in
the situation with which we are concerned here, the
responses of juries are restricted to a scale of dollars. Dollar
amounts of punitive awards (like the length of prison
sentences in criminal cases) are just one of a number of
possible scales on which outrage might be expressed. A
bounded numerical scale would be another obvious
possibility. We propose that some factors  affect the mapping
of punitive intent onto the dollar scale, but do not affect
punitive intent on a bounded numerical scale. For example,
the size of the defendant firm is an important factor in
translating punitive intent into dollars; a judgment that
appears severe when the defendant is a small firm may
appear grossly inadequate when the defendant is a giant.
Thus firm size will affect dollar awards even if it does not
affect punitive intent as measured on a bounded numerical
scale.
In summary, the outrage model assumes an internal state
of outrage, which can be mapped onto different response
scales.  These scales vary not only in their complexity but
also in the precision and reliability of the measurement that
they support: some scales are 'noisier' than others. As we will
shortly see, the dollar scale is an extremely noisy expression
of punitive intent.
Our two central hypotheses were simple:
                                                                                                   
94 The size of the awards was also affected by the amount demanded
by plaintiff.  This observation is most likely to be an anchoring effect,
which influences the dollar award directly, independently of punitive intent.
The anchoring effect may be quite important in light of the unfamiliarity of
the dollar scale as a scale of punishment, a point that we will discuss in
some detail.
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1. Shared outrage
The outrage evoked by different scenarios of tortious
behavior is governed by a bedrock of broadly shared social
norms.
With respect to outrage and punitive intent, are randomly
selected juries likely to be similar to one other? And are
rankings of different scenarios generally similar for different
demographic groups? We hypothesized affirmative answers
to both questions, at least in the context of the products
liability cases given here.
2. Erratic dollar amounts
In contrast to outrage and punitive intent, which are
measured on bounded scales, punitive awards denominated
in dollars are susceptible to large individual differences, which
could be a significant cause of the unpredictability of jury
determinations.
This prediction was tested by comparing the extent of
variations in judgments about outrageousness and
appropriate punishment with the extent of variations in
judgments about appropriate dollar awards.
We also examined three other hypotheses:
3. The harm effect
Punitive intent— as measured on a bounded numerical
scale— is determined by the outrageousness of the
defendant’s behavior and by other factors, prominently
including the harm suffered by the defendant.
The prediction that harm affects punitive intent but not
outrage was tested by presenting alternative versions of some
scenarios, in which the severity of the harm suffered by the
plaintiff was varied.
4. Firm size effect
Damage awards are determined by punitive intent and by
other ascertainable factors, prominently including the size of
the defendant firm.
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This prediction was tested by presenting each scenario in
two versions, in which the size of the defendant was varied.
5. Less discrimination without comparison
In a “no-comparison” condition, there is a cautious
tendency to place cases toward the middle of a bounded
numerical scale, and hence people will not make appropriate
distinctions among cases.
This hypothesis was tested by giving respondents cases in
isolation and in the context of other cases.
B. Shared Outrage
Our first question was whether the degree of outrage is
consistent across individuals and across possible juries. A
simple way to answer this question is to examine whether
rankings of different scenarios are generally similar for
different demographic groups. We therefore computed the
means of the three responses (outrage, punitive intent and
dollar awards), separately for groups of respondents defined
by demographic variables (men, women, white, Hispanics,
African-Americans, different levels of income and education).
To measure the level of agreement across disjoint categories
(e.g., men and women) we computed the correlation between
their average responses,95 over the set of 28 cases.
The correlations were remarkably high for judgments both
of outrage and of punitive intent. In particular, there was
essentially perfect agreement among groups in the ranking of
cases by punitive intent: the median correlation was .99. Men
and women, Hispanics, African-Americans, and whites, and
respondents at very different levels of income and education
produced almost identical orderings of the 28 scenarios used
in the study.96 Judgments of intent to punish in these
                                                                                                   
95 We used means for outrage and punishment and medians for dollar
awards.
96 Of course, considerable variability between individuals remains
within a given demographic category, even though the aggregate
responses are very similar to the aggregate responses of another
36 CHICAGO WORKING PAPER IN LAW AND ECONOMICS
scenarios of product liability cases evidently rest on a bedrock
of moral intuitions that are broadly shared in society. We also
looked for differences among groups in the average severity
of their judgments (i.e., the level of the average rating), and
here too found no significant differences (with the one
exception of gender, to be taken up below).
This striking finding may not generalize to all domains of the
law.97 We might expect to find larger differences between
communities and social categories in other domains of the
law, perhaps including attitudes toward civil rights violations
and environmental harms; at least it is possible that, for
example, African-Americans would rate civil rights cases more
severely than whites do. We expect, however, that within the
same category of cases, rankings may remain the same
across different groups, so that different demographic groups
would agree on which defendants have behaved least and
most egregiously. Here there is a great deal of room for
further empirical work.
Table 1. Correlation Between Demographic Groups
on Intended Severity of Punishment*
Men
Gender Women .974
Black White
Ethnicity White .975
                                                                                                   
category. Our analysis simply shows that identifiable groups have similar
distributions, not that all individuals are alike.
97 There is also a question whether the competing narratives of the
real world of juries might create more heterogeneity than is revealed by
the responses to our fairly stark case descriptions. In some cases, it it
imaginable that members of different groups would be especially alert to
some facet of the narrative of one or another side. Experiments involving
mock juries might be designed to test for this possibility.
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Hispanic .963 .988
< 30K 30-50K
Household 30-50K .991
Income > 50K .986 .986
< 30 30-39 40-49
Age 30-39 .994
40-49 .992 .994
> 50 .991 .993 .987
* Entries are correlations between mean responses to
scenarios by respondents in the indicated demographic
categories.
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C. The Exception of Gender Ratings
As noted, the only statistically significant difference in
average ratings was between women and men. While women
and men ranked the scenarios identically (as indicated by the
extremely high correlations), men were somewhat more
lenient and women were somewhat more severe: women
rated the plaintiff’s behavior as more outrageous (a mean
difference of .52 scale units, p < .001), expressed more
punitive intent (a mean difference of .37 scale units, p < .001),
and set higher log dollar awards (p < .01). There was also an
interaction between scenarios and gender, in which women
assigned even higher ratings of outrage and punishment (but
not higher awards) to cases in which the plaintiff was female
(p < .05).
This finding should not be overemphasized; the
differences in ratings were relatively small. But it bears on
legal and social disputes about jury composition, providing
some empirical evidence that women do reach different
conclusions from those reached by men and in particular that
they seek more severe punishment of civil defendants. The
fact that women tend to favor stiffer punishments— and that
men tend to favor more lenient punishments— is in one sense
counter to folk wisdom, which sees women as particularly
lenient. But our finding is in line, broadly speaking, with other
research suggesting that women and men view social risks
differently and, in particular, that women tend to view such
risks as more serious than men do.98
D. Unpredictable Dollar Awards
Our central hypothesis was that dollar awards are erratic
because of individual differences in the mapping of punitive
intent onto the dollar scale. To test this hypothesis we
produced simulated juries by randomly sampling, with
                                                                                                   
98 See Paul Slovic, University of Chicago Legal Forum (forthcoming
1997).
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replacement, groups of 12 responses to each case for each
response scale. In this manner we constructed a large
number of three types of simulated juries: “outrage juries,”
“punishment juries,” and “dollar juries.” Of course there is a
large question about how a set of individual judgments will
produce a jury verdict. No doubt group dynamics can push
deliberations in unexpected directions, sometimes toward the
most extreme member of the group. As a statistical matter,
however, the experimental literature on the relationship
between prior individual judgments and the outcomes of
group deliberation suggests that the median judgment is a
good predictor,99 and indeed may even understate our
ultimate conclusion.100
We therefore used the median judgment of each simulated
jury as an estimate of what the judgment of that jury would
have been. Without losing sight of the limitations of our
                                                                                                   
99 See James Davis, Group Decision Making and Quantitative
Judgments, in Understanding Group Behavior (E. Witte and James Davis
eds. 1996); Shari Diamond and Jonathan Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to
Verdict Consequences, 26 Law and Society Review 513 (1992). Clearly,
the appropriateness of this measure may depend on the task structure of
the group (e.g., whether or not a unanimous decision is required).
However, in our study, replacing the median of juror’s individual
judgments as the group decision with the mean, has little effect on the
results for outrage and punishment, but makes dollar awards even less
predictable.
100 See Diamond and Casper, supra note; Davis, experiment 1, supra
note; Martin Kaplan and Charles Miller, Group Decision Making and
Normative Versus Informational Influence, 53 J. Personality and Social
Psychology 306 (1987). Note, however, the existence of an “amplification
of bias,” by which a group process, involving a set of individuals biased on
one direction or another, may push awards in extreme directions, in fact
more extreme than that of any individual before deliberation begins. We
are indebted to Robert MacCoun for suggesting this possibility. Cf. N.
Kerr, Robert MacCoun, and G. Kramer, Bias in Judgment: Comparing
Individuals and Groups, 103 Psych. Review 687 (1996) (finding an
amplification of bias, but not in the setting of punitive damage
determinations). The possibility of extremes resulting from group
deliberation would fortify our conclusion, by showing even greater
variance.
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estimation procedure, we apply the label “jury judgment” to
these estimates for simplicity of exposition. Table 2
summarizes the simulated jury judgments for punishment and
dollar awards.
Jury judgments can be considered shared and therefore
predictable, in our use of that term, if there is high agreement
between juries randomly selected from the population. In
order to find a source of erratic judgments, we attempted to
compare the predictability of the judgments made by
simulated dollar juries, outrage juries, and punishment juries.
First, we imagined that all of our case scenarios were tried on
the same day by independent juries, analogous to how jury
judgments for different cases are produced in practice. We
then asked the question, “If these same cases were tried
again independently, how likely are we to get the same
ratings and rankings as in this first set of trials?”
To answer this question we conducted an analysis
requiring 4 steps. (1) We created a randomly selected jury for
each of the 28 cases, and computed the median judgment for
each. (2) We then imagined that a time machine allowed us to
replay each case again independently of the first trial,
including the random selection of a new jury. We therefore
created a second set of 28 randomly selected juries and
corresponding median judgments. The correlation between
these and the first set of jury judgments is a measure of how
erratic or consistent juries are. (3) To get a more reliable
indication of the typical correlation between juries, we
performed Step 1 60 times for each of the three response
modes. This produced 180 columns of data, each of which
contained one set of 28 jury judgments. (4) We then
computed the correlations between every pair of sets of
simulated jury judgments (i.e., correlations between the
columns). This computation was performed both within
response (e.g., the correlation between two sets of 28 outrage
ratings) and across responses (e.g., the correlation between a
set of 28 outrage ratings and a set of 28 punishment ratings).
The data shown in Table 3 are medians of the correlations
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obtained for each response mode or response mode
combination.
As we had hypothesized, the individual differences in
dollar awards produce severe unpredictability, and highly
erratic outcomes, even in the medians of 12 judgments (the
results would be even more extreme with smaller samples
such as 6-person juries). While there is strong agreement
between independent sets of outrage or punishment juries (r =
.87 and .89), agreement between independent sets of dollar
juries is quite weak (r = .42). The variability of individual dollar
judgments is so large that even the medians of 12 judgments
are quite unstable. The problem could be reduced, of course,
by taking larger samples. For example, we found that the
median correlation between sets of dollar juries rises to .80
when the size of the juries is increased to 30 (median
correlations for 30-person outrage and punishment juries rise
to .95 and .97).
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Table 2.  Synthetic Jury Response Distributions by Scenario
Scenario
Firm
Size
Harm
Level
Lower 95%
Confidence
Bound Median
Upper 95%
Confidence
Bound
Mean Jury
Punishment
Prediction Error
Ratio ($/Punish)
Joan Large High $500,000 $2,000,000 $15,000,000 5.14
Joan Medium High 200,000 900,000 3,000,000 5.03
Thomas Medium — 200,000 500,000 1,575,000 5.02
Martin Medium High 350,000 1,000,000 4,000,000 4.98
Thomas Large — 200,000 560,000 2,750,000 4.95
Joan Large Low 175,000 1,000,000 12,500,000 4.93 13.57
Martin Large High 350,000 1,900,000 10,000,000 4.92
Frank Medium — 230,000 760,000 2,100,000 4.86
Frank Large — 225,000 1,000,000 4,000,000 4.82
Mary Large — 290,000 1,000,000 4,000,000 4.79
Joan Medium Low 150,000 750,000 5,500,000 4.71
Mary Medium — 250,000 710,000 2,100,000 4.70
Martin Large Low 350,000 1,000,000 5,000,000 4.47
Martin Medium Low 200,000 675,000 2,250,000 4.16
Susan Large — 100,000 300,000 1,000,000 3.27
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Scenario
Firm
Size
Harm
Level
Lower 95%
Confidence
Bound Median
Upper 95%
Confidence
Bound
Mean Jury
Punishment
Prediction Error
Ratio ($/Punish)
Susan Medium — 50,000 225,000 800,000 3.03
Janet Medium High 100,000 200,000 690,000 2.79
Carl Medium — 15,000 155,000 375,000 2.78
Carl Large — 50,000 200,000 750,000 2.64
Janet Medium Low 0 150,000 650,000 2.49
Janet Large High 0 287,500 1,500,000 2.39
Janet Large Low 12,500 200,000 1,000,000 2.38
Jack Large High 0 0 350,000 1.24
Jack Medium High 0 45,000 225,000 1.07
Jack Medium Low 0 0 112,500 1.03
Jack Large Low 0 2,550 500,000 0.95
Sarah Large — 0 0 1,000 0.51
Sarah Medium — 0 0 13,000 0.46 infinity
Median
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Table 3. Median Correlations Between Sets of Simulated
Juries
Outrage Punishment $ Awards
Outrage .87
Punishment .86 .89
$ Awards .47 .51 .42
Overall Median Award.71 .77 .69
How do these findings bear on the appropriate role of
juries in setting punitive damage awards? As we have seen, a
conventional understanding of such awards sees the jury as a
sample from the community whose function is to provide an
estimate of community sentiment. If jury judgments are erratic,
this function is badly compromised, for any particular jury’s
judgment may not reflect community sentiment at all. The
bottom row of Table 3 presents the median correlations
between sets of simulated jury judgments for the 28 scenarios
and the corresponding estimates of community sentiment, for
which we used the overall median of dollar awards for each
scenario. It is obvious that the judgments of dollar juries
provide a poor estimate of overall community sentiment.
Indeed, the unreliability of dollar juries is so pronounced that
the dollar awards that would be set by the larger community
are predicted more accurately by punishment juries. This is a
counterintuitive finding. It leads directly to a possible
recommendation, which we explore below: juries instructed to
state their punitive intent could be used, in conjunction with a
preset conversion function, to generate punitive awards that
would accurately represent community sentiment, thus
reducing much of the unpredictability of awards.
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E. The Underlying Problem: “Scaling without a Modulus”
A key to our analysis is a distinction that psychologists
draw between two types of scales. (i) Category scales are
bounded and anchored in verbal descriptions at both ends;
scales of this type are often used in public opinion surveys,
and were used here to measure outrage and punitive intent.
(ii) Magnitude scales are unbounded and are defined by a
meaningful zero point. These scales are often used in the
psychological laboratory, for example to scale the brightness
of lights or the loudness of sounds. Magnitude scales have
occasionally been used to measure the intensity of response
to socially relevant stimuli, such as the severity of crimes and
the severity of punishments.101 The dollar scale of punitive
awards is obviously not a category scale; it satisfies the
defining characteristics of a magnitude scale, for the zero
point is meaningful and the scale is unbounded.
Although the relations between the two types of scales
have been the topic of much controversy,102 some
characteristic differences between them are well established.
(i) The distributions of judgments on magnitude scales are
generally positively skewed, with a long right tail (this is a
consequence of the fact that the scale is bounded by zero at
the low end); (ii) judgments on magnitude scales are often
erratic, in the sense of highly variable; (iii) the standard
deviations of individual judgments of different objects (a
measure of variability) is often roughly proportional to the
mean judgments of these objects.
 The common practice in laboratory uses of magnitude
scaling is to define a modulus: respondents are instructed to
                                                                                                   
101 Stanley S. Stevens, Psychophysics (1975); see also note infra.
102 See, e.g., R. Duncan Luce and Carol Krumhansl, Measurement,
Scaling, and Psychophysics, in Stevens’ Handbook of Experimental
Psychology, Vol 1: Perception and Motivation 3-74 (Richard Atkinson,
Richard Herrnstein, Gardner Lindzey, and R Duncan Luce eds. 1988); L.E.
Marks, Magnitude Estimation and Sensory Matching, 43 Perception and
Psychophysics 511 (1988); Stanley S. Stevens, Psychophysics (1975).
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assign a particular rating to a “standard” stimulus, defined as
the modulus, and to assign ratings to other stimuli in relation
to that modulus. Thus, for example, a modulus of “5” might be
assigned to a noise of a certain volume, and other noises
might be assessed in volume by comparison with the
modulus. An experiment can, however, be conducted without
specifying a modulus. In this situation of magnitude scaling
without a modulus, different respondents spontaneously adopt
different moduli, but their responses generally preserve the
same ratios even when the moduli differ. For example, one
observer may assign a judgment of 200 to a stimulus that
another observer rates as 10. If the first observer now assigns
a rating of 500 to a new stimulus, we may expect the second
to assign to that stimulus a value of 25.
Here is the central point: Magnitude scaling without a
modulus produces extremely large variability in judgments of
any particular stimulus, because of arbitrary individual
differences in moduli. The assignment of punitive damages
satisfies the technical definition of magnitude scaling without
a modulus.103 This reasoning is what led to the central
hypothesis of the present study, a hypothesis that we
described and established above.104
                                                                                                   
103 In the legal context, some moduli might even be insufficiently
informative even if provided. If, for example, $0 means entirely
acceptable, and $200 means objectionable (as in for example a reckless
act causing minimal harm), the jury would probably continue to be at a
loss for most punitive damage cases. A modulus would have to provide a
standard around which judgments could be managably organized in the
likely comparison set.
104 Similar evidence emerges from Michael Saks et al., Reducing
Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21 Law and Human Behavior 243 (1997).
Saks et al. show that under experimental conditions, variability can be
reduced in the context of pain and suffering awards by telling people
average dollar awards for the type of injury at issue, intervals (where 80%
of awards for similar injuries fell), average--plus-intervals, and examples
(awards for four similar cases). Id. at 249. Without using the concepts,
Saks et al. in effect supply a modulus in each of these conditions, and the
result is dramatically to decrease variability Id. at 250-51. See also the
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F. A simple way to improve predictability
Is it possible to improve the predictability of dollar awards?
How might this be done? We performed a statistical analysis
designed to answer these questions.
A conventional view about the role of juries in setting
punitive awards is that the jury is a sample from the
community, whose function it is to provide an estimate of
community sentiment. In the context of our experiment,
community sentiment about the punitive damages for a
scenario was defined as the median of the damages set by all
the respondents who judged it. This sentiment represents
population-wide judgments about appropriate dollar awards.
The findings summarized in Table 3 suggest a straightforward
procedure for improving the accuracy with which this
community sentiment can be estimated from the judgments of
a sample of 12 citizens: use judgments of punitive intent and
a conversion function based on the results of a large sample,
one that can be taken to reflect a population-wide judgment.
To test the effect of this procedure in our data, we first
estimate the conversion function separately for medium and
for large firms, since there was a significant effect of firm size
on dollar awards. Following Stevens,105 power functions were
estimated, which related the mean punishment jury response
for each case to the corresponding overall median of
individual dollar awards, our measure of community
sentiment. We then generated two sets of simulated jury
judgments for each case. The first set consisted of the median
judgments of 100 randomly sampled dollar juries. The second
set was obtained by taking the median judgments of 100
randomly selected punishment juries, and transforming this
value to dollars, separately for each jury, by the appropriate
                                                                                                   
proposal for a form of scaling, through baseline appraisals, in Glen O.
Robinson and Kenneth S. Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort Law, 78 Va.
L. Rev. 1481, 1490 (1992).
105 See Chapman and Bornstein, The More You Ask For, The More
You Get, 10 Applied Cognitive Psych. 519 (1996).
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conversion function (depending on whether the defendant firm
was large or medium-sized). To measure the accuracy of a
simulated jury as an estimate of the population median, we
computed the discrepancy between the dollar award set by a
jury (for punishment juries we used the dollar value from the
conversion function) and the overall median dollar award for
that case. From these discrepancies we can compute the
root-mean-squared-error (RMSE), which is a conventional
measure of accuracy of estimation, and is analogous to the
standard error of the estimate in a regression model.
This analysis provides two values of RMSE for each of the
28 cases in our study, one from dollar juries and one from
punishment juries. In 25 of the 28 cases, RMSE is smaller
(indicating higher accuracy) for estimates derived from
punishment juries. To assess the magnitude of the effect, we
computed the ratio of the two values of RMSE for each
scenario (listed in the last column of Table 2). The median
ratio was 2.18, which is interpreted to mean that for the
median case, using dollar juries leads to over twice as much
prediction error than using punishment juries and a
conversion function. For example, for the case of Joan with a
medium firm size and high harm, the ratio is 2.27, the median
award is $1,000,000, and the estimates of dollar juries have
an average error from this value of $913,481 compared to
$402,414 for estimates based on punishment juries.
In simple language, this means that unpredictability could
be greatly reduced, and population-wide judgments about
dollar awards would be estimated far more precisely, if the
legal system used punishment juries and a conversion
function rather than dollar juries. Indeed, as can be seen in
Table 2, the median probably understates the decisive overall
advantage of using predictions based on punishment ratings,
since for some individual cases the reduction in error is
extremely large.
One note of caution is in order here. The fact that punitive
damages share the known deficiencies of magnitude scaling
is likely to be a significant cause of unpredictable punitive
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awards— but it is not the only one. Other factors include
regional differences, plaintiff’s demand, anchors of various
sorts, differences in social norms over both time and space,
the quality of the lawyers on both sides, and doubtless others.
We take up some of these points below.
G. Context, Harm, Firm Size, and Other Findings
In this section we briefly report our findings on our other
hypotheses, and discuss some issues of particular relevance
to punitive damage reform.106
1. The effect of context
Unlike real jurors, who are exposed to a single case for a
long time, the participants in our study responded to a total of
10 product liability cases in quick succession, and had an
opportunity to compare most of these scenarios to each other.
To examine the effect of this unusual procedure, every
participant first encountered one of the first six scenarios,
which was presented in a separate envelope and was
evaluated in isolation from the others. The experimental
design provides a comparison of the distribution of judgments
to each scenario when it is judged in isolation or in the context
of other scenarios.
We examined whether the availability of a context of
comparison affected the distribution of judgments; the
question is important, since the legal system often forces
juries to evaluate cases without a set of comparison. Our
basic finding was that in a no-comparison condition, there is a
cautious tendency to diminished differentiation in judgments
about different cases. The availability of a context apparently
makes a serious cases appear more serious than it would on
its own, and makes a milder case appear milder. Thus the
most consistent effect of a context of similar cases is to
increase the range of the judgments across different
scenarios. We conclude that the availability of a context of
                                                                                                   
106 A detailed analysis can be found in Daniel Kahneman, David
Schkade, and Cass R. Sunstein, supra note.
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similar cases improves people’s ability to discriminate among
these cases, but does not affect the basic moral intuitions that
the cases evoke. This point is connected to the topic of
punitive damage reform below.
2. From outrage to punishment: the harm effect
An action can be judged more or less outrageous without
reference to its consequences; certainly it is possible to think
that the outrageousness of an action does not depend on
what actually happened. Consequences, however, are
important to punishment in law,
 
107 and we suspected that they
would also be important to lay intuitions about the proper
punishment for reprehensible actions. These predictions were
tested by constructing alternative versions of four additional
vignettes, which differed in the harm that the plaintiff had
suffered. Note that the difference was measured qualitatively
rather than in dollar terms; in all of the cases, the jury had
awarded $200,000 in compensatory damages, but in some of
them, the description of the injury suggested less in the way
of qualitative loss, as for example in the case of a burned
child. (See the Appendix for examples.)
As predicted, we found that the degree of outrage evoked
by the defendant’s behavior was not affected by the harm that
occurred. In contrast, varying the harm had a small but
statistically significant effect on punishment ratings, where
defendants who had done more harm to the plaintiff were
judged to deserve greater punishment. As predicted by the
outrage model, the significant harm effect found for
punishment ratings carried through to dollar awards. Thus low
harm produced an average award of $727,599 and high harm
an average award of a substantially greater amount:
$1,171,251.
                                                                                                   
107 Thus there is a great deal of discussion whether attempted crimes
should be punished less severely than well-executed crimes, if both show
the same state of mind, and if an unsuccessful attempt failed because of
some accident. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Deterrence and the Punishment
of Attempts, 19 J. Legal Stud. 435 (1990).
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3. The effect of firm size
Within the academic community, opinion is sharply divided
on the question whether the amount of punitive awards should
depend on the size of the defendant firm.108 Lay intuitions, in
contrast, are quite clear. A psychological analysis suggests
that people think in terms of retribution rather than
deterrence, and the intention to punish is an intention to inflict
pain; this means that the size of the defendant matters a good
deal. (We do not deny that there is a plausible account of
deterrence that would make firm size pertinent.109) Our
hypothesis was that firm size would affect neither outrage nor
punitive intent, but that the same degree of punitive intent
would be translated into a larger amount of damages when
the firm is larger than when it is smaller.
As expected, we found no statistically significant effects of
firm size on either outrage or punishment judgments. But
large firms were punished with much larger dollar awards (an
average of $1,009,994) than medium firms ($526,398). This is
substantial evidence that equivalent outrage and punitive
intent will produce significant higher dollar awards against
wealthy defendants.
                                                                                                   
108 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note; Galanter and Luban, supra
note; Kenneth Abraham and John Jeffries, Punitive Damages and the
Rule of Law: The Role of Defendant’s Wealth, 18 J. Legal Stud. 415, 415-
19 (1989); Dan Dobbs, Ending Punishment in “Punitive” Damages, 40 Ala.
L. Rev. 831, 871-72 (1989).
109 That account might stress the organizational structure of the firm
and suggest that high-level managers will not alter policies unless an
award is sufficient to “get their attention.” Polinsky and Shavell, supra
note, suggest that this view is implausible, but that question cannot be
resolved a priori; it is an empirical issue. Compare Robert MacCoun,
Differential Treatment of Corporate Defendants by Juries, 30 Law &
Society Review 121, 133-39 (1996) (finding effects from corporate identity
and commercial activity, but not from wealth per se).
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IV. POLICY REFORMS: COMMUNITY JUDGMENTS
WITH MEANING AND WITHOUT NOISE?
A. General Observations, Anchoring, and a Roadmap
1. Experiments and the real world
What are the implications of our findings for punitive
damage reform? Before answering that question it is
necessary to emphasize that those findings do not replicate
the real world of punitive damage awards. Ours was an
experimental study, and our “juries” consisted of individuals
who were given brief narrative descriptions of cases. They
were not presented with full accounts, much less with
adversary arguments on both sides. These arguments could
introduce additional variance; they could tend to reduce
disparities. The fact that lawyers on both sides can typically
exclude certain jurors may possibly reduce the degree of
variance in real-world awards, at least if lawyers can
anticipate which people will have outlier moduli. Nor did our
“juries” deliberate.110 As a statistical matter, the median vote
is not a bad prediction, but it is certainly a crude one, at least
for individual cases.
2. Anchors and their effects
Our study did refer to compensatory damages and also to
firm size, but it did not contain two usual “anchors”:111
plaintiff’s demand and the jury’s own prior determination of
compensatory damages. Such anchors are likely to matter a
great deal to actual awards. There is experimental evidence
that the plaintiff’s demand has considerable importance,112
                                                                                                   
110 We are now embarking on a follow-up study that does involve
mock juries, and hence that attempts to be more precise about the effects
of deliberation.
111 With the exception of firm size and also compensatory damages,
which might serve as an anchor, but probably less than in real world
cases, whether those damages are chosen by deliberating juries and thus
may have special salience.
112 See Hastie, Schkade, and Payne (forthcoming).
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and experimental evidence too of the effect of anchors in pain
and suffering cases, which are analogous.113 There is real-
world as well as experimental evidence of an anchoring effect
from the compensatory award.114 Other anchors may well
emerge during the lawyers’ advocacy. Notably, there is
evidence of a correlation between anchoring and confidence,
that is, when people are not confident of their judgments, they
are more susceptible to anchoring effects.115 We suspect that
people are not confident of the dollar amounts they award,116
and this lack of confidence increases the likely use of
anchors. It is natural to think that the process of magnitude
scaling without a modulus will encourage people to seize on
whatever anchors are available, whether or not they are
sensible from the point of view of the goals of the legal
system.
How does the existence of real-world anchors affect our
findings? The answer is that anchors may or may not increase
predictability. If it is hard to know in advance what will be
used as the anchor, predictability will be absent; if everyone
knows what the anchor is likely to be, there will be less in the
way of unpredictable outcomes. But if this is so, this particular
form of predictability comes with a cost of its own: introducing
an additional layer of arbitrariness, if (as if likely) the anchor
is itself arbitrary on normative grounds. There is no reason to
think that the plaintiff’s demand should carry a great deal of
weight in determining the proper punitive award. And if the
compensatory award anchors the punitive award, there is a
kind of arbitrariness to the extent that anchor is arbitrary, as
                                                                                                   
113 See Michael Saks et al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards,
21 Law and Human Behavior 243, 254 (1997).
114 See Theodore Eisenberg et al., supra note.
115 See Karen E. Jacowitz and Daniel Kahneman, Measures of
Anchoring in Estimation Tasks, 21 Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin 1165 (1995).
116 There is some support for this in our study; we asked people to say
what they thought was the most difficult part of the task, and their answers
emphasized the assignment of dollar amounts.
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deterrence theory suggests that it is. We suspect that juries
lacking evident anchors will suffer from the problems we have
described, whereas juries resorting to anchors will produce
arbitrariness of a different sort.
3. The rule of law and how to obtain (and how not to
obtain) its virtues
Many concerns about punitive damage awards point to
their apparently arbitrary character, and many proposed
remedies attempt to promote rule of law values through, for
example, more careful and more specific judicial instructions.
In the BMW case, Justice Breyer spoke in some detail of the
failure of Alabama law sufficiently to discipline jury discretion
with clear criteria about the grounds of awards.117 Thus a
likely response to complaints about arbitrary awards is to
increase the specificity of instructions to juries.
Our study strongly supports Justice Breyer’s general
concern, but it points to a source of variability very different
from that emphasized by Justice Breyer. Contrary to the
common view, the problem does not lie in insufficiently clear
instructions to juries. The problem is instead the effort to
measure attitudes in dollars. Even general and open-ended
instructions can produce a high degree of predictability if the
response mode is appropriate. Even specific and tailored
instructions are likely to produce a high degree of
unpredictability if the wrong response mode is used. 118
For purposes of obtaining the virtues associated with the
rule of law, emphasized by Justice Breyer and many others,
the solution lies in counteracting the arbitrariness that comes
from the unbounded dollar scale of dollars. Of course rule of
law virtues are not the only virtues of a legal system,119 and
                                                                                                   
117 116 S. Ct. at 1605-1607.
118 There is the further problem that juries do not always follow even
detailed instructions. See Hastie, Schkade, and Payne (forthcoming).
119 Cf. Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in Joseph Raz,
The Autonomy of Law (1986).
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constraints on erratic awards may not produce all of the
necessary reform. We will shortly turn to these issues.
4. Deterrence and retribution
We have noted that some observers think that the purpose
of punitive damages is to provide optimal deterrence, and we
have referred to a standard economic argument based on this
claim. Our findings here strongly support the following
conclusion: If optimal deterrence is the purpose of the award
of punitive damages, the jury system is an extremely bad
institution. This is so for two reasons. The first has to do with
the jury’s motivations. The second has to do with the jury’s
capacities.
First, ordinary people do not spontaneously think in terms
of optimal deterrence when asked questions about
appropriate punishment, and it is very hard to get them to
think in these terms. People come to the role of juror with
retributive intuitions, and it remains unclear whether and to
what extent those intuitions can be overcome in the
courtroom. Perhaps deterrence plays some role in actual
awards, and perhaps it would be possible to shift the jury’s
attention in the direction of deterrence through more insistent
and more carefully designed jury instructions.120 Our study
does not rule this possibility out of bounds. But together with
other studies that show a jury’s reluctance to follow
instructions on the purpose of punitive awards,121 it does give
                                                                                                   
120 See Polinsky and Shavell, and in particular the model jury
instructions offered as Appendix A. Polinsky and Shavell want the judge to
say: “Your principal task is to estimate the likelihood that the defendant
might have escaped having to pay for the harm for which he or she should
be responsible. . . . You should use the Table below to determine the
punitive damage multiplier that corresponds to your estimated probability
of escaping liability.”
121 See Reid Hastie, David Schkade & John Payne (forthcoming),
reporting the outcomes of mock jury tests of punitive damages. After
deliberating during which the “jurors” received copies of the judge’s
instructions, participants were asked specific questions on the important
elements on which they make judgments of punitive damages. A lenient
56 CHICAGO WORKING PAPER IN LAW AND ECONOMICS
reason to questions whether large-scale shifts are likely. Even
if focused on deterrence, a jury will be influenced by moral
judgments with a retributive dimension, and these judgments
will point in the direction of high awards for conduct that is
outrageous but likely to be detected (perhaps a murder or an
environmental disaster).
Second, jurors are not likely to be good at the task of
promoting optimal deterrence even if this is what they are
seeking to do. If, for example, punitive damage awards are
supposed to be grounded in the probability of escaping
detection, it is sufficient to say that ordinary people are very
bad at making post hoc probability judgments. In order to
assess the probability of detection with any precision, people
have to master a high degree of technical knowledge about a
wide variety of subjects. Hindsight bias will almost inevitably
confuse the assessment:122 A jury is likely to find a bad
outcome to have been likely to occur if it in fact occurred.
Various heuristics and confusion will in all probability infect
the assessment. If optimal deterrence is the goal, some
institution other than a jury, probably an administrative body
composed of experts and charged with the specific task,
would be much better.
Our findings strongly suggest that the best justification of
continued use of the jury involves the desire to elicit, and to
make relevant for law, the community’s judgment about
                                                                                                   
grading of this written, recall-comprehension test yielded a mediam score
of only 5% correct.
Note also Anderson and MacCoun, Goal Conflict in Juror’s
Assessments of Compensatory and Punitive Damages (unpublished
manuscript 1997), showing leakage between compensatory damages and
punitive damages.
122 On the general topic of hindsight bias, see Baruch Fischoff,
Hindsight = Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment
Under Uncertainty, 1 J of Experimental Psychology 288 (1975). See also
Reid Hastie, David Schkade, and John Payne, (forthcoming 1997), which
shows a hindsight bias directly for punitive damages— a difference, in an
experimental setting, of a probability judgment of 37% without hindsight,
and a probability judgment of 71% after hindsight.
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appropriate retribution. For those who believe that retribution
is not a good use of the system of civil and criminal law, this
justification will of course be unconvincing. And for those who
believe that deterrence is the most important ground for civil
law, with retribution playing a modest or supplementary role, a
system that elicits and uses community judgments without
noise will at best produce a modest improvement.
We therefore arrive at a simple conclusion. To the extent
that there is an argument for continued reliance on the jury in
awarding punitive damages, it must depend on the possibility
of obtaining, in individual cases, an understanding of the
public’s judgment about the egregiousness of the wrong and
the appropriate degree of response.123 The task is to find a
method to obtain that judgment without introducing
arbitrariness and noise.
5. Isolating objections to the current system
Punitive damages reform should attempt to ensure that
juries are charged with performing tasks that they can perform
well, and should relieve juries from having to perform tasks
that they perform poorly, in a way that produces excessive
unpredictability,124 confusion, and arbitrariness. And it would
be reasonable to react to our study by suggesting a simple
reform: Juries should decide questions of civil liability, just as
                                                                                                   
123 See Galanter and Luban, supra note.
124 Of course there is a question how bad it is for jury judgments to be
unpredictable, and what kinds of unpredictability are acceptable. If
prospective defendants can assess judgments that are unpredictable in
particular cases in order to get a sense of “expected value,”
unpredictability may not be so bad from the standpoint of optimal
deterrence. One reason that unpredictability is bad is that it may make
planning more difficult if expected value is costly or impossible to
calculate, and it may create overdeterrence in risk-averse actors; another
reason is that it makes for a form of unfairness, since people who are
similarly situated are not treated similarly. Of course predictability is not
the only value. A modest degree of unpredictability may well be better
than a system in which, for example, jury judgments are predictably too
low or too high.
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they do questions of criminal liability. But judges should
decide on the appropriate level of punitive damages, just as
they do criminal punishment, subject, in both cases, to
guidelines laid down in advance.125 Of course there is a
possible problem with judicial judgments about punitive
awards, just as in the case of judicial choice of criminal
sentences: In both cases, judges are scaling without a
modulus, and different judges will reach different conclusions,
thus producing arbitrariness. Hence there is good reason for
guidelines and constraints on judges. In any case our study
provides strong support for the practice, found in some courts,
of reviewing punitive awards to ensure that they are
consistent with general outcomes in other cases. Judges
need not fear that this practice is antipopulist, for as we have
seen, the award of any particular jury may well fail to reflect
the community’s sentiment on the topic of appropriate dollar
award.
To evaluate these and other possible reforms, it is
important to distinguish, more carefully than we have thus far,
among three possible objections to the idea of using the
juries’ dollar amounts, as the legal system currently does.
The first objection emphasizes sheer unpredictability. The
problems here are that potential defendants are not given fair
notice and similarly situated people are not treated similarly,
in large part because any particular jury’s judgment about the
appropriate dollar award is unlikely to reflect the judgment of
the community as a whole about the appropriate dollar award.
The second objection points to defective calibration, that
is, to a poor translation of punitive intent into dollars. The
problem is that juries lack the information that would enable
them to undertake a good or accurate translation, since
ordinary people cannot know the effects of a particular dollar
award on a particular class of defendants.
                                                                                                   
125 See Symposium, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Ten Years
Later, 91 Nw. L. Rev. 1231 (1997), for various views on the guidelines now
in place.
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The third objection is directed against punitive intent and
points to improper grounds for judgment. Here the complaint
is that the jury is focusing on irrelevant factors, giving undue
weight to relevant factors, giving insufficient weight to relevant
factors, or even ignoring relevant factors. If optimal
deterrence is the goal of punitive damages, the outrage model
will be quite unappealing. Moreover, public judgments are
mediated by social norms, and if those norms are
objectionable (as they might be, for example, in the area of
sexual harassment), a noise-free punitive damage judgment is
objectionable too.
More particularly, three objections lead naturally to three
different directions for possible reform. We should stress at
the outset that all three reforms allow the jury not to focus on
dollars, though for quite different reasons.
We offer these reforms partly as thought experiments,
designed to help specify problems with the current system. To
evaluate any of them, and to choose among them and more
familiar alternatives, a great deal of additional work would
have to be done, much of it involving a comparative analysis
of different institutions. What we claim to do is to show, on the
basis of our study, how legal goals mesh, and fail to mesh,
with an understanding of the psychological underpinnings of
punitive awards. An important point in this connection is that
ordinary people are intuitive retributivists, and there is a
serious question about the role of retribution with respect to
corporations and firms.126 The retributive idea is most
naturally and simply introduced with respect to people who
have imposed harms;127 the goal is to make wrongdoers
suffer. But firms are not persons, and when punitive damages
are imposed, the people who are injured, or made to suffer,
may not be wrongdoers at all. Thus a punitive damage award
imposed on a firm may well end up injuring not “the firm” so
much as consumers, stockholders, employees, and managers
                                                                                                   
126 See Polinsky and Shavell, supra note.
127 See Jean Hampton, supra note, at 111.
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who had nothing to do with the underlying wrong. It is far from
clear that juries awarding punitive damages are aware of this
point, and it is also far from clear that they can be easily
convinced that the point is correct.
B. Punitive Damages Reform, I: Community Judgments about
Dollars, or Predictable Populism
1. A modest proposal
From what we have said thus far, the most modest reform
proposal is straightforward, and it is modest indeed. The goal
of the modest reform is to get a true understanding of
community judgments— true in the sense that it filters out the
noise and arbitrariness that come from asking random groups
of twelve people to come up with (the community’s judgments
about) dollar amounts. If this could be done successfully, it
would, in one simple stroke, reduce the problem of
unpredictability by a large factor (in the illustrative data used
here, by a factor of 2.18).
We have seen that if particular juries are asked to produce
a dollar award, as an indicator of community sentiment, there
will be a great deal of variability, and that there is also a
degree of susceptibility to anchors that have little or no
normative weight. But if juries are asked to produce not dollar
amounts but either punishment ratings or punishment
rankings, the number that results can be turned into what we
might call “true dollar awards,” by the simple step of taking the
jury’s rating or ranking and using a population-based
calibration function like that described above to produce a
dollar value.
Because this approach does what the current system
seeks to do with so much less noise and arbitrariness, it
should be counted as a nearly unambiguous improvement. It
accepts the sovereignty of community judgments with respect
to punitive damages, even dollar awards, and it uses the jury
to obtain an estimate of what the population as a whole, if
equally informed, would want to have done. The use of a
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calibration function obtains a more accurate reading of the
population’s dollar judgment, in a way that eliminates errors
introduced by reliance on individual juries for dollar amounts.
Through this route it would be possible to produce much more
predictability without sacrificing anything else.
2. Administrative issues
There is, to be sure, a serious administrative challenge in
generating and using a calibration function. An especially
hard question is how to define the category of cases against
which any particular case would be assessed.128 There is also
a question whether to alter the calibration function when
social norms have changed. But these difficulties may not be
insuperable; at least experimentation along these lines may
be worthwhile. A set of common scenarios would be devised
in different areas of the law, for which both punishments and
awards would be determined.129 The calibration could be
done (say) every five years, to take account of changing
social norms.
As Part III above shows, the most important step would not
be especially difficult to carry out. Data would also be
collected on the effects of firm size and any other pertinent
factors. Once this has been done, the procedure in individual
cases would be simple. The court would elicit the jury’s
intention to punish; this, in addition to firm size and other
factors, would be used to come up with an estimate of the
population’s median judgment for that scenario.
                                                                                                   
128 We have dealt here with products liability cases; but is this too
narrow or too broad a category? In the context of discrimination, for
example, should race and sex discrimination cases be separated? How
neatly can contract and tort law be separated, and what subdivisions are
appropriate within those categories?
129 Some cautionary notes, in the context of pain and suffering,
emerge from David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury
Damages Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparatrive
Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive
Damages, 80 Iowa Law Review 1109, 1125 (1995), which discuss possible
problems with jury understanding of cases.
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3. Two phases
To accomplish this task, the judge would be required to
put the jury’s focus on intended judgments about punishment
rather than dollars; it is the calibration function that would turn
those judgments into dollars. Thus a two-phase process
would be required. The jury instruction in Phase One might
read roughly like this: “Usually, the legal system awards
damages in order to compensate the plaintiff for the wrong
done by the defendant. These damages are called
compensatory damages. But in cases of severe wrongdoing—
extreme recklessness or intentional harm— the legal system
also allows you to impose a punishment, one that goes
beyond the amount necessary to compensate the plaintiff.
The purpose of this punishment is to deter future wrongdoing
and to reflect your view about the need just for compensation
but also for punishment, because of the special
circumstances of the case. Any punishment will eventually
take the form of dollars. Your judgment will be translated into
an appropriate dollar amount by taking account of the general
population’s views on how to turn you ranking [or rating] into
dollars.” The judge might conclude: “Your choice is very
important. It will be the basis for the financial punishment that
will ultimately be imposed on the defendant.”
4. Ratings and rankings
For the first phase, it is necessary to make two judgments:
about the wording of any questions to be put to the jury, and
about the relevant scale on which the jury’s normative
judgment will be expressed. If a goal is to promote
predictability in awards, perhaps the most obvious route
would be to require juries to make judgments along a
bounded numerical scale. A jury might, for example, be asked
to decide where the case falls on a scale of 0 to 6 or 0 to
10.130 The advantage of this approach is that it would lead to
                                                                                                   
130 Relevant discussion and a related proposal can be found in David
Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages
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greater predictability with respect to damage awards, and it
would thus avoid much of the randomness that characterizes
jury selection of dollar amounts. It may therefore be
worthwhile for states to experiment with some such approach,
at least in some of the settings that call for punitive damages.
But there are problems with a bounded numerical scale. At
least if they are accompanied only by verbal descriptions of
the sort we have given here, the relevant numbers (0 to 6, 0
to 10) are likely to be perceived as having a highly artificial
quality.131 In practice such scales can work quite well;
consider the existence of popular and relatively informative
movie ratings that use such scales, or ask whether it might be
possible to rate judges, lawyers, or law review articles on
such a scale. But juries are likely to be skeptical that the
numbers have much meaning. There is a further problem:
With a relatively vague scale, different people are free to
interpret the labels in different ways. Perhaps most important,
our data show that there is more (implicit) agreement on
rankings than on absolute numbers. Hence the use of
numbers will produce less predictability (though more
precision) than an attempt to produce rankings, though it is
still far better than dollars.132
                                                                                                   
Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparatrive Additur/Remittitur Review
of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 Iowa Law
Review 1109 (1995). The authors propose judicial review of awards by
reference to comparison cases, building on existing practice. Our
proposals represent a more dramatic departure from existing practice.
131 There is also a risk that a small set of numbers will make it difficult
for the jury to make enough distinctions among cases; a large set of
numbers will reintroduce some of the problems of an unbounded dollar
scale. In some especially heinous cases— for example, O.J. Simpson-style
murders— the jury may well be drawn to the largest possible number (6 or
10), and it is possible that this will make it harder to make relevant
discussions.
132 The intuition behind this judgment should be straightforward. If you
are asked to assess something— a meal, a conference, a lecture, a
concert, a brief, a law review article, a judicial opinion— you may well have
a hard time making use of a bounded numerical scale. (On a scale of 0 to
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It follows that a superior alternative is probably to provide
juries not with a bounded numerical scale but with a
calibrated set of scenarios of punitive damage cases, set so
as to show mild wrongdoing, not subject to any award, all the
way to very egregious wrongdoing, requiring a very
substantial award.133 The jury would be asked to assess the
case at hand in terms of the sample cases, not with any dollar
amounts or even numbers. The jury could be given a set of,
say, ten scenarios, provided without any preset ordering
(although the scenarios would have been ranked in a large
                                                                                                   
10, how was last night’s dinner?) It is much easier to make comparisons—
to compare meals, conferences, lecture, briefs, and the like against one
another. Comparisons avoid the need to generate uniformity among
heterogeneous people with respect to the meaning of the key terms.
133 See the detailed and instructive discussion of comparison cases
for additur and remittitur judgments, in Baldus et al., supra note, at 1153-
1160; see also the discussion of pain and suffering schedules in Robert
Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and
Suffering,” 83 NW L Rev 908 (1989).
Note, however, that a great deal depends on the choice of the relevant
comparison set. If the comparison cases are extremely outrageous, it
would be possible to lower punitive damages award in a systematic way. If
the comparison cases are not so bad, it should be possible to ensure high
awards. There is also a possibility of framing effects. The phenomena of
“tradeoff contrast” and “extremeness aversion” may well play a large role
in jury determination. Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich, and Amos
Tversky, Context-Dependence in Legal Decisionmaking, 25 J Legal Stud.
287, 288 (1996). Extremeness aversion refers to the fact that people do
not like to take a position that falls on a pole on a continuum; hence
people like an option better if it is intermediate. Extremeness aversion can
produce “compromise effects,” as when people rank an option under
consideration in between the poles. Tradeoff contrast arises when the
option under consideration is evaluated more favorably in the presence of
similar but clearly inferior options than it appears in the absence of such
options. Id. at 288-289. (The option can also be evaluated less favorably
in the presence of similar but clearly superior options.) A good way to
handle extremeness aversion is with cases that are genuinely extreme—
involving, for example, high outrage numbers for genuinely rare and
outrageous cases, and low outrage numbers for cases that do not
plausibly involve intentional or even reckless wrongdoing.
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pretest). The jury’s task would be to compare the case at
hand successively to each of the ten scenarios, to determine
whether it is worse or less bad. The relevant score would be
the number of scenarios that are better, plus 1. This gives you
a ranking of the case in the set of 11, without requiring the
jury to rank all 11. There is no real need for the jury to spend
time discussing the details of the orderings of fictitious
scenarios. Different scenarios would be provided for different
areas of the law: libel, products liability, damages to natural
resources, assault, and so forth.134 The jury could say, for
example, that of the six cases provided, the case at hand is
the next-to-worst, or closer to 5 than to 4. The jury would also
be allowed to go off the scale, by deciding that the case at
hand is less deserving of punishment than the least serious
cases, and also that it is deserves more severe punishment
than the most serious case.
A key advantage of this approach is that the jury would be
selecting a dollar amount only implicitly, and not explicitly.135
As compared to a bounded scale, it requires a more concrete
and intuitive task, and thus may stand as the best way of
promoting predictability while maintaining a substantial role
for the jury. There are some disadvantages too. It is possible
that with rankings, the jury will disagree with the legal
system’s rankings, and this may confound the whole
                                                                                                   
134 Thus, for example, Baldus et al., supra, at 1154-1155, discuss
certain grounds for creating a typology for purposes of additur or remititur
for medical malpractice, including, in the context of intentional
wrongdoing, (1) obstruction of justice, such as destruction of evidence of
negligence, (2) other dishonesty, such as failure to disclose to patient
available options, (3) delivery of nonapproved care, (4) intent to cause
harm in delivery of care. There is a similar hierarchy for willful disregard.
Id. What we are suggesting is that ideas of this kind might be used to
develop scenarios for jury use.
135 If the no-comparison effect had been stronger, this procedure
would have been clearly superior. The limited effect of the no- comparison
condition merely removes one reason for adopting the procedure, but it is
still far better than the status quo, and seems better than any alternative
that seeks to maintain a role for the jury in registering its moral judgment.
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enterprise. It could be argued that the ranking might serve to
educate jurors about community values and judgments, but it
cannot be denied that some juries might reject what they are
told. On this count ratings have an advantages. Another
disadvantage of this approach is that it requires a legislature
or commission to generate the scenarios, a more complex and
contested task than that involved in using a bounded
numerical scale. Our overall judgment is that rankings are
likely to work better than ratings; doubtless a fair bit of
experimentation would make sense to find what works best.
An experimental study, in the context of pain and suffering
awards, has shown that the practice of offering examples of
awards in similar cases can dramatically decrease
variability.136 Our own study of context provides additional
support for the general idea of providing a context of cases,
and the benefits would extend to both rankings and ratings.
5. Using Scenarios and Cases: A Note on Existing Practice
Some aspects of these proposals may seem unusual.
Indeed, it has long been impermissible to describe award
amounts to juries through actual or hypothetical cases, mostly
because of the allegedly prejudicial effect of such
references.137 Moreover, judicial review of punitive damage
judgments tends to be highly individualized, and hence to rely
on context-independent intuitions (putting to one side the fact
that past experience may produce a sense of context and
comparison).138 Thus adjustments are often made by
reference to the ratio between compensatory and punitive
                                                                                                   
136 Michael Saks et al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21
Law and Human Behavior 243, 250-51 (1997). Of course there is a risk of
strategic behavior on the jury’s part if the jury becomes aware of the
relevant conversion function, and steps must be taken, perhaps through
jury instructions, to counter this risk if it materializes.
137 D.C. Barrett, Annotation, 15 A.L. R. 3d 1144 (1967).
138 See Baldus et al., supra note, at 1132-1133.
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damages (a crude test, for reasons suggested above) and ad
hoc judgments about what seems “shocking.”139
The idea of examining comparison cases is not, however,
entirely foreign to the legal culture. Damage schedules and
scaling through examples have been used successfully in the
settlement of mass tort cases.140 Such ideas have often been
discussed in the context of pain and suffering awards.141 In a
prominent case involving such awards, Judge Kearse, writing
for the Second Circuit, attempted a careful comparison of the
case at hand with twelve other cases.142 Nor has comparison
been unavailable in the context of punitive damages, at least
in the process of judicial review.143 In an influential case, the
court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit said that a district court
should compare other punitive damage cases to a “a figure
derived from the facts of the case at hand.”144 And
comparison of cases is a pervasive aspect of appellate review
of punitive awards, furnishing a constraint on arbitrariness
and inequality.145 Of course the Supreme Court has not
                                                                                                   
139 See, e.g., Malandris v. Merrill Lynch, 703 F.2d 1152, 1177 (10th
Cir. 1981); Baldus et al., supra note, at 1133.
140 See Francis McGovern, The Alabama DDT Settelment Fund, 53
Law & Contemp. Probs. 61 (1990): Francis McGovern, Resolving Mass
Tort Litigation, 69 B. U. L. Rev. 659 (1989).
141 David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages
Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittur Review of
Awards For Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 Iowa L. Rev.
1109, 1122-1225, 1134-1137 (1995); Robert Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life
and Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and Suffering,” 83 NW L Rev 908
(1989).
142 748 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1980).
143 See, e.g., Bogan v. Stroud, 958 F.2d 180, 186 (7th Cir. 1992);
Cash v. Beltmann N. Am. Co., 800 F.2d 109, 111 n. 3 (7th Cir. 1990);
Estate of Korf v . A. O. Smith, 917 F.2d 480, 485 (10th Cir. 1990); Ismail
v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 186 (2d Cir. 1990); Schultz v. Thomas, 649 F.
Supp. 620, 624-25 (E.D. Wis. 1986); Sherrod v. Piedmont Aviation, 516 F.
Sup. 46, 56 (E. D. Tenn. 1978).
144 Morgan v. Woessner, 997 F.2 1244, 1257 (9th Cir. 1993).
145 See Klein v. Grynberg, 44 F. 3d 1497 (10th Cir. 1995);Stafford v.
Puro, 63 F.3d 1436 (7th Cir. 1995): Allahar v. Zahora, 59 F.3d 693 (7th
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insisted on this requirement as a matter of constitutional law.
In an echo of some early death penalty cases,146 the Court
said that each case might be taken as sui generis. Because
punitive damage judgments require juries to “make a
qualitative assessment based on a host of facts and
circumstances unique to the particular case before it.
Because no two cases are truly identical, meaningful
comparisons of such awards are difficult to make.”147 Thus the
Court said that a comparative approach cannot be a “ ‘test’ for
assessing the constitutionality of punitive damage awards”
even though it would not “rule out the possibility that the fact
that an award is significantly larger than those in apparently
similar circumstances” might be relevant to the constitutional
issue.148
The Court’s reluctance to impose a constitutional
requirement of comparing cases is understandable in light of
the Court’s caution about proceeding at the constitutional
level in the face of principles of federalism and gaps in the
                                                                                                   
Cir. 1995): Ross v. Black and Decker, Inc., 977 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir. 1992):
Vasbinder v. Scott, 976 F.2d 118 (2nd Cir. 1992); Kimzey v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568 (8th Cir. 1997): Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805
(2nd Cir. 1996): King v. Macri, 993 F.2d 294 (2nd Cir. 1993): Michelson v.
Hamada, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 343 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994): Wollersheim v. Church
of Scientology, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992): Baume v. 212 E.
10 N.Y. Bar Ltd., 634 N.Y.S. 2d 478 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Parkin v.
Cornell University Inc., 581 N.Y.S.2d 914 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992):
146 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (invalidating
a mandatory death penalty statute).
147 TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources, 509 US 443, 457
(1993).
148 Concurring, Justice Kennedy pointed to the high likelihood of
legitimate inconsistency in jury results. Partly this is, in his view, a function
of the fact that a jury is empanneled in a single case, not as a permanent
body; partly this is a function of the generality of of jury instructions. 509
U.S. at 472. Thus a lower court suggested that review of other jury
determination “would undercut the jury system” and that various numbers
are based on the fact that “juries hear unique facts and are given
dissimilar instructions.” In Re Exxon Valdez, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12952,
12959 n. 7 (D. Ala. 1995).
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Court’s knowledge of the actual world of punitive damage
awards. Nothing said here demonstrates that such a
requirement would be sensible as a matter of constitutional
law. But it is clear that a principal concern with the existing
system stems from inadequate constraints on jury discretion,
and it is now clear that a serious problem arises from the
response mode of dollars and the difficulty of generating
predictable dollar amounts. Our findings fortify the wisdom of
the appellate practice of comparing punitive damage awards,
and they suggest the possibility of a constitutional problem
with awards that appear, in practice, to be stabs in the dark.
C. Punitive Damages Reform, II: Using Punitive Intent but not
Dollars, or Technocratic Populism
The second kind of reform, we have suggested, would
attempt to elicit the jury’s punitive intent, or its judgment about
appropriate punishment, but would not ask the community to
make decisions about dollar amounts. On this view, it is
agreed that the jury’s intention to punish is what should
govern punitive damage awards. In this way, the outrage
model is accepted on normative grounds. The problem is that
the most modest reform proposal, just described, perpetuates
the crucial defect of the current system, that is, it relies on the
abilities of ordinary citizens and hence the community to
translate punitive intention into dollars (which, we have
argued, results largely in stabs in the dark). There is an
analogy here with the criminal justice system as it now stands:
Juries make decisions about criminal liability (decisions that
undoubtedly have a dimension of “punitive intent”); but
judges, within the constraints of applicable guidelines, make
decisions about sentencing, presumably because of their
greater expertise and insulation from irrelevant or illegitimate
factors.
Here is a simple argument for the second kind of reform.
People are unlikely to know what it takes to hurt different
people of different means through financial punishment. They
certainly do not know what it takes to hurt an organization.
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Whether or not an organization is involved, they are also
using unbounded dollar scales, lacking a modulus that would
give meaning to their estimates of different magnitudes.
Hence it would be necessary to devise a translation formula
that depends on the community’s normative judgments about
intended punishment, which are not only predictable but also
worth using, but not on community judgments about dollar
amounts, which can be made more predictable but which may
not be worth using. To do this well, it would be desirable to
translate the jury’s intention to punish with expert assistance.
Here are the two phases of a possible reform.
1. Phase one in the two-phase system: the jury’s role
If the legal system is interested in the jury’s punitive intent,
but not in the community’s judgments about dollar awards,
phase one would look very much like phase one in the
modest recommendation described above. The goal here too
would be to obtain the jury’s judgment about ratings or
rankings. Thus the judge’s instruction might be similar to that
described above, but with a different ending, such as “It is the
job of the judge and the legislature, and not the jury, to decide
on specific dollar amounts. Your job is to help in that task by
informing the court of how severely, in your view, the
defendant deserves to be punished.” Here too there is a good
argument that rankings are preferable to ratings, because
they are less artificial and do not run up against a judgment
that the numbers on a bounded scale are arbitrary and
meaningless.
2. Calibration and phase two: translating jury judgments
into dollars
Phase two, we have noted, involves the translation of a
jury’s normative judgment— of intent to punish— into dollars.
We assume that the jury’s judgment about appropriate
punishment is the appropriate foundation for the award and
that the problem for correction is that a jury is in a poor
position to know what dollar awards will actually do. In that
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case, the point of a good translation is to ensure that the
expressed punitive intention is turned into awards that are
both predictable and faithful to what the jury truly intends to
happen. The translating institution would have to know a great
deal about the effects of dollar awards on both individuals and
firms. It would also have to make judgments about the effects
of the defendant’s income and wealth. Of course the judgment
about how to translate would involve many evaluative
judgments. A legislature or commission charged with making
those judgments might ask, for example, about the effects of
various kinds of awards on both individuals and firms. When
high punitive awards are given, how exactly do firms suffer,
and are the people who suffer high-level officials, clerical
workers, or consumers? The judgment about dollar awards
would emerge through engagement with such issues.
D. Improper Grounds for Judgment and the Partial or
Complete Elimination of Juries: Bureaucratic Rationality?
1. An insufficiently explored problem
Our findings put in sharp relief a large and almost entirely
unexplored problem: Whether, in light of what is or might be
known about human psychology and cognition, lay people are
willing and able to make judgments in the way that the legal
system deems desirable. There is good reason to believe, for
example, that if punitive damages are designed to produce
optimal deterrence, juries should be eliminated, for it is
doubtful that they can be made to carry out that task. If this is
the goal of punitive damages, surely it would be better for the
judgment to be made by a judge or (better still) by a
specialized regulatory agency entrusted with precisely that
task.
Under the most natural justification for allowing punitive
damages to be awarded by juries, punitive awards should be
seen as serving a retributive or expressive function, in which
social norms are brought to bear on certain behavior, offering
a public “statement” about appropriate outrage and
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punishment. There can be little doubt that judgments about
outrage and punishment may diverge from judgments about
optimal deterrence; people may want to punish a murderer via
punitive damages even if the probability of detection was
100%. Our discussion thus far suggests a simple idea: if
juries are appropriately used, it is because their intuitions are
more or less acceptable, assuming that they can be
adequately disciplined. We know a good deal about these
intuitions: high sensitivity to outrage (which probably implies
low sensitivity to detection probability), substantial sensitivity
to harm (which may not be fully expressed in the amount of
compensatory damages), great sensitivity to firm size, and a
retributive focus.
A decision to retain the jury system means that these
intuitions are appropriately used for purposes of civil
punishment, at least as a good first approximation. But if our
diagnosis of the intuitions is correct, there is a risk from a
translation formula: juries may feel exposed to the possibility
of being ignored, and may respond by behaving strategically.
Thus there is a limit to the extent to which the translation
formula can stray from common intuitions.
2. Improper grounds for judgment? Punitive damages
reform, III
The most serious objection to our second proposal
therefore comes from the view that juries do not and cannot
easily be made to base their decisions on the proper
grounds.149 On this view, the problem is that the intention to
punish, even if well-translated, is not an adequate way to
assess punitive damage awards, because it is, from the
                                                                                                   
149 See Hastie et al., supra note. In that study, two-thirds of mock-
juries that deliberated to a verdict decided that punitive damages were
warranted in actual cases in which appellate and trial judges had
concluded otherwise. This strong tendency to find liability for punitive
damages was partly a product of the jurors’ failure to consider the judge’s
instructions; juries that discussed those instructions more fully were less
likely to impose punitive damage liability. Id.
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normative point of view, too sensitive to irrelevant factors, and
too insensitive to relevant factors. In the criminal law, juries
are not asked to identify their punitive intent, with a separate
calibration by the judge; instead the determination is made by
the judge subject to the sentencing guidelines. Why, it might
be asked, wouldn’t the same approach make sense for
punitive awards?
The basic claim here would be that juries cannot be used
to promote the aims, properly understood, of the system of
punitive damages. There are at least three possible
objections. The first is that retributive or expressive goals
would be better carried out via the criminal law, or even by
regulatory law at the local, state, and national levels.
Certainly in the environmental area, expressive and
retributive motivations have played a large role in areas not
involving juries. There is a continuing issue whether
retributive judgments by juries can be sufficiently informed by
relevant facts, and made reliably to express relevant values,
so to serve as a sensible adjunct to the remaining fabric of the
law. Even if we focus on retributive goals, can punitive
damages be paid to fit with the rest of the law, so as to create
a sensible regime of retribution?
The second objection would be that deterrence is the
appropriate goal of punitive damages and that juries cannot
be made willing and able to inquire reliably into how to
achieve deterrent goals. It appears that outrage is inattentive,
or insufficiently attentive, to factors that are central to the goal
of optimal deterrence, most prominently the probability of
detection. If this is so, then an administrative or regulatory
body would be better. Certainly it would seem that the inquiry
into the probability of detection is a factual one that juries lack
the information to undertake properly. And if outrage is
attentive to irrelevant factors, the case for abandoning the jury
is strong, even or perhaps especially when some form of
punishment is desirable. Predictability is obtainable, as
suggested in our earlier reform proposals, but perhaps
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without satisfying the substantive goals of a well-functioning
system of punishment.
The third objection would be that existing community
judgments about intended punishment should, in some
contexts, be “impeached” by legislative deliberation. The
community’s sentiment might depend, for example, on social
norms that the legal system should not recognize. Thus it
might be thought that in some cases, the community’s
judgments are too lenient or too severe. In the area of racial
discrimination or sexual harassment, a legislative body might
question what juries are likely to do; perhaps juries would be
insufficiently sympathetic to plaintiffs who suffer from injuries
not fully recognized as such by existing social norms. Juries
are emphatically populist institutions; in a way our study’s
basic point has been to give more precise content to this
commonplace. In a nonpopulist republic that sometimes
distrust community norms, displacement of general sentiment
is hardly rare.
If we agree that the intention to punish is relevant to the
punitive award, but not decisive, there is a simple response:
Use the jury’s intention to punish as one among a set of
factors for judicial consideration in imposing punitive damage
awards. The judge might be required to consider as well the
size of the defendant, the probability of detection, the illicit
character of the defendant’s gains, and other factors. A
general requirement of this kind would not impose enormous
demands on the legislature involved in punitive damage
reform. As just stated, however, a risk with such an approach
arises from the fact that weights have not been given to the
various factors; the absence of weights raises the danger that
judicial determinations will also suffer from unpredictability.
Hence the legislature or commission might attempt to give
greater guidance, by, for example, offering scenarios
accompanied by dollar awards, creating ranges, or providing
floors and ceilings.
Certainly more dramatic alternatives can be imagined,
including those that dispense with a jury entirely. An
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administratively-operated schedule of fines and penalties
would seem better than juries at producing deterrence, for
such a system would reduce the costs of decision and
probably reduce the costs of error as well. There are many
analogies. Discussion of pain and suffering awards has
included “technocratic” suggestions designed substantially to
reduce the jury’s role in the interest of more consistent and
more expert judgments.150 In the context of damages to
natural resources, it has been suggested that contingent
valuation should be replaced by a schedule of damages
based on categories of harm;151 in this way an antecedent set
of administrative or legislative judgments would form the
backdrop for judgments by a trustee, thus making it
unnecessary to ask what may be hopelessly uninformative
questions of individuals about their willingness to pay.
There are real-world precedents for this kind of approach
in many domains of law, in which ad hoc determinations have
been replaced with a system designed to produce more in the
way of coherence and rationality. The system of workers’
compensation was created partly because of the high
decision costs and randomness produced by case-by-case
jury judgments about, for example, the value of a lost limb.152
In its current form, workers’ compensation attempts to deal
with problems of valuation by placing a fixed dollar value on
various injuries through a pre-determined schedule produced
by a legislature or administrative agency.153 The problem with
the workers’ compensation system is its crudeness; it ignores
                                                                                                   
150 See Baldus, supra note, at 1125-1131; Bovjberg et al., supra note,
at 923
151 See Richard B. Stewart, Damages to Natural Resources, in
Analyzing Superfund 219, 241-44 (Richard L. Revesz and Richard B.
Stewart eds. 1995).
152 See Richard Epstein, Cases and Materials on Torts 1014-1038
(1994).
153 Id. at 1035-1038.
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possibly relevant individual variations. Its virtue lies in its
speed, inexpensiveness, predictability, and consistency.154
In a related but more recent shift, the process of case-by-
case judgment with respect to sentencing has been replaced
by the more standardized Sentencing Guidelines. A central
goal of the guidelines is to discipline the process of “mapping”
complex normative judgments onto a relatively less bounded
scale of criminal punishments.155 The fact that judges, rather
than juries, have traditionally made decisions about
appropriate sentences raises a question about why a similar
course is not followed for punitive damages.156 The basic
point is that in both of these cases, a process of bureaucratic
rationalization has replaced one of relatively ad hoc
judgments; it is easy to imagine a similar development with
punitive damages.
An even more relevant model can be found in the “grid”
used for social security disability determinations, which uses
age, educational attainment, and residual functional capacity
to produce standardized judgments about disability.157
Administrative law judges are asked to make case-specific
judgments, which become part of an assessment governed by
the rule-like “grid.” It is useful to ask, as a thought experiment,
why juries, rather than grid-governed administrative law
judges, are not asked to make disability determinations.
                                                                                                   
154 See id.
155 See Mashaw, supra note, at 150-165.
156 There are of course differences between the two settings. The
distinctive stigma associated with criminal punishment may make it seem
especially important to insulate judgments from the kinds of passion and
zeal that might operate in a jury. That stigma may also make a degree of
specialized experience, and even guidelines, especially important. And
juries do, of course, have some control over sentencing through choices
about criminal liability, especially when there are different theories of
liability.
157 See generally Jerry Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative
State (1984); see also Rubin, supra, discussing administrative fines
(without, however, showing that the problems posed by scaling without a
modulus have been overcome).
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Surely the answer is that jury determinations would suffer
from a range of problems, including insufficient specialization
and expertise, inevitable arbitrariness and unpredictability,
and confusion stemming from the use of an unfamiliar scale.
But if jury judgments would be inappropriate for disability
determinations, why do they make sense for punitive
damages, or for that matter for judgments about
compensation in cases involving pain and suffering or libel?
Any answer would have to refer to the legitimate domain of
populism in law, an issue to which we return below.
Radical changes of the kind just discussed call for a
comparison of the likely performance of different
governmental institutions. Dramatic changes might be
criticized on the ground that the populist elements of jury
assessment should be retained, in order to ensure that public
outrage plays a significant role in the legal system. It is also
possible to fear that technocratic substitutes for the jury would
be subject to pathologies of their own, perhaps because of
their own biases, and because of the pressures likely to be
imposed by well-organized private groups. If so, the more
modest reforms are better. We have sought to undertake the
first step toward that evaluation: specifying the underlying
considerations with a better understanding of what produces
punitive awards. The disadvantage of the most extreme
departures from the current system is also their advantage:
They would not rely on the jury’s normative judgment about
outrageousness and intended punishment. What we have
proposed is that there are ways to retain this goal while also
diminishing the unpredictability of punitive damage awards.
E. Mixed Approaches, Caps, and Multipliers
It is possible to imagine mixed approaches, drawing on
different aspects of our proposals. For example, a jury might
be provided with a preselected set of exemplar cases,
accompanied by the damages actually or reasonably awarded
in these cases; its job might be to assess damages by
comparing the case at hand to the preselected cases. This
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approach would not take the whole subject of dollar awards
away from the jury; it would attempt to root punitive awards in
a set of antecedents judgments that could reasonably be
compared with the case at hand. The damages in the
exemplar cases might be based on actual past judgments, on
judgments of mock juries, or on judgments of experts in the
particular area.
Other mixed approaches might attempt to supply a kind of
modulus. Juries might, for example, be given average dollar
awards for the type of injury at issue, or intervals (showing
where a certain percentage of awards for similar injuries fell),
or both average dollar awards and intervals.158 Doubtless a
degree of experimentation would help show which approach
works best.
Currently, both the federal government and the states are
discussing more conventional reforms, which would impose
caps, or require punitive damages to be within some multiple
of compensatory damages, or allow judges to have a larger
role in disciplining jury awards.159 We might compare various
reform proposals by asking which would contain the lowest
sum of decision costs and error costs, recognizing that there
is no simple metric for assessing these kinds of “costs.” It is
clear that the chief advantage of caps and multipliers is their
simplicity and low administrative cost; their chief disadvantage
is that they are unlikely to do much to decrease error costs,
and they may even increase them.
If the problem is that juries are not now made to think in
terms of optimal deterrence, both caps and multipliers are
extremely crude. There is no reason to think that either of
these reforms would ensure that punitive awards are tailored
to compensate for the likelihood that injured parties will not
bring suit. If optimal deterrence is the goal, the best solution
would be to abandon the jury and to delegate power to an
institution willing and able to think well about optimal
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deterrence. If the problem is that isolated juries come up with
arbitrary or unpredictable outcomes, and if the purpose of
reform is to ensure that punitive damage awards capture
either the community’s intentions with respect to dollar awards
or the community’s judgments with respect to punitive intent,
the conventional proposals are also far inferior to those we
have discussed here.
A cap, a multiplier, or judicial oversight will obviously do
little to ensure expression of community will with respect to
either dollars or punitive intent. A cap has one important
advantage; it is easily administered, and it may prevent
awards that are plainly excessive. But a cap is of course
crudely tailored, and it may even increase variability, partly
because the cap may serve to anchor jury judgments and thus
draw jurors to the upper bound.160 The best that can be said
about a cap is that with little administrative cost, it will
eliminate the most egregiously large judgments, but this virtue
comes with many vices.
A damage multiplier might be a bit better, in the sense that
it would also have low decision costs while allowing more
flexibility than a cap by permitting very high awards when the
compensatory damages are especially serious— while also
having the advantage of preventing a jury from imposing
unreasonable punishments on a individual or a corporation.
But any multiplier would have crudeness of its own. No theory
of punitive damages justifies a multiplier approach.
Of the proposed reforms, a shift from jury to judicial
determinations of punitive damages appears to the most
promising. Such a shift may well produce improvements over
the current system, at least if it were thought that the relative
populism of the jury allows illegitimate or irrelevant factors to
                                                                                                   
160 See Michael Saks et al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards,
21 Law and Human Behavior 243 (1997 (finding that caps are likely to
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See also V.B. Hinsz and K. E. Indahl, Assimilation To Anchors for
Damage Awards in a Mock Civil Trial, 25 J. Applied Social Psych. 991
(1995) (finding anchoring effect from caps).
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play a role, or that a judge, because of her experience with
multiple cases, can make more informed judgments. (Again
compare criminal sentencing, of course undertaken by judges
rather than juries.) Judges do reduce punitive awards that
appear excessive, and because of their experiences judges
have some comparative advantages;161 it is likely that a more
general shift toward judicial control with reference to
comparison cases would produce improvements. But judges
are not likely to be able to capture the community’s
sentiments with respect to either dollars or punitive intent, and
if the community’s sentiments are irrelevant or only part of the
appropriate inquiry, probably an administrative agency, with
more detailed understanding of regulatory goals and
instruments, should discipline the judge’s inquiry.
The most important point is that judges too are likely to
have difficulty in mapping normative judgments onto dollar
amounts, and hence while judicial judgments may reduce
variance, there is likely to be a continuing problem of erratic
judgments or use of anchors that introduce arbitrariness of
their own. Judicially assessed punitive awards might well
replicate some of the problems with judicially determined
sentences. Thus any movement from jury to judicial control of
punitive damage awards might well be accompanied by some
form of scaling or scheduling, perhaps building on the old
practices of additur and remittitur in a way that is
psychologically well-informed.162 As we have suggested,
various reform combinations and alternatives might be
imagined, including dollar awards that are chosen after
exposure to comparison cases.163
We do not have sufficient information to evaluate all the
possible alternatives here. But we can offer two general
                                                                                                   
161 See note supra.
162 See Baldus et al., supra note, at 1125-1131.
163 Cf. Saks et al., supra, at 251 (discussing dollar awards in pain and
suffering cases that are chosen after exposure to scales and similar
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conclusions. First, there is much to be said on the behalf of an
incremental step, building on current practice: ensuring, in
every jurisdiction, a serious oversight role for judges, calling
not for individual judicial judgments about individual cases,
but for judicial comparisons among various similar cases, so
as to ensure against dramatic outliers.164 This incremental
step would produce some of the gains sought by the first
reform proposal discussed above. Second, the ideal system
of punitive damage awards would not involve juries or even
judges, but specialists in the subject matter at hand, who are
able to create clear guidelines for punitive awards. These
guidelines would be laid down in advance and based on a
clear understanding of different forms of wrongdoing and of
the consequences, for defendants, of different awards. Of
course these specialists would make several judgments of
value, and those judgments should be subject to democratic
control. The practical question is whether it is possible to
design that ideal system. Experiments in this direction can be
found in the workers’ compensation system and in the system
of administrative penalties and fines.
Table 4 summarizes what has been a complicated
discussion; our overall evaluations must be tentative because
much depends on some unanswered empirical questions
about the likely operation of the different systems.
F. A Note on the Constitution
How, if at all, does what we have said bear on the
constitutional analysis of punitive damage awards, an issue of
fresh importance in the aftermath of BMW v. Gore? The most
important point is that we have identified a source of those
jury judgments that may be both unconstitutionally excessive
and unconstitutionally arbitrary. When a particular jury’s
judgment is extreme, an underlying reason may well be the
                                                                                                   
164 Compare Judge Weinstein’s fascinating discussion of use of
comparison cases in the context of pain and suffering, in Geresy v. Digital
Equipment, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14332 (Sept. 16, 1997).
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difficulty faced by the jury in using an unbounded scale. Our
findings certainly do not resolve the constitutional issue,
which depends on the appropriate approach to the due
process clause; but they do help to fortify the view that some
awards should be taken to unacceptably arbitrary. We have
shown that it cannot confidently be said that high jury awards,
requiring payment of some amount $X, reflect a well-
considered community judgment in favor of $X, or that jury
encounters with the particulars of cases will lead to a situation
in which particular facts are matched to dollar awards of X,
1/2 of X, and 1/4 of X. Indeed, our findings and our first reform
proposal demonstrate that the populist credentials of any
particular jury award may be overstated; any particular jury’s
award may poorly measure the judgment of the community as
a whole. As noted, moreover, we have found reason to doubt
the suggestion that this problem can be cured by more
detailed instructions from the court, at least if those
instructions do not solve the problem of scaling without a
modulus.
Of course the Supreme Court cannot by itself require one
of our three proposals, or some variant; the selection of
reform methods is for legislatures rather than courts. Mostly
the judicial role should come at the subconstitutional level,
through review of punitive awards corresponding to the
standards outlined above. But the availability of these routes
suggests the possibility of retaining a significant role for the
jury without providing so large a risk of arbitrariness. None of
our three proposals should raise constitutional problems. On
the contrary, each of them attempts to overcome the
difficulties to which the Court attempted to respond in BMW v.
Gore.
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Table 4. Punitive Damage Reform Possibilities
Description Analogies Virtues Vices
Evaluation
1. Current
system
ad hoc
judgments
about
particular
events, with a
populist
aspiration
“Kadi justice”
(as discussed
by Max
Weber)
allows a role for
popular convictions
unpredictability,
susceptibility to
arbitrary anchors,
jury ignorance
about effects of
dollar awards
hard to defend
from any
standpoint; the
best that can be
said is that the
current problems
are not so serious
2. Caps prevents the
most
excessive
awards
current civil
rights statutes,
which also
impose a cap
easy to administer,
would prevent
egregiously large
awards
may increase
variability; crudely
tailored to any view
of the problem or
the purpose of
punitive awards
unlikely to make
things much better
and may in some
ways make things
worse
3. Damage
multipliers
ties punitive
awards to
compensatory
awards
Sherman
Antitrust Act
more flexible than
caps, also easy to
administer
crude, since
compensatory
award is a rough
guide to
appropriate
punitive award
a little better than
caps, but not much
better
4. Provide
juries with
other cases
and their
retains jury
authority over
dollars
Proposals in
the area of
pain and
suffering
Should improve
predictability and
increase rationality
Unclear how jury
will respond to prior
awards if it
disagrees with
promising way of
providing context
and cabining
judgment, but may
Description Analogies Virtues Vices
Evaluation
accompanying
punitive
awards, in
dollars
awards them; unclear how
to make sure the
prior awards
contain the right
amounts
be too complex
5.
Strengthened
or exclusive
judicial  control
“civil
sentencing”
model
current system
of criminal
justice
may reduce
unpredictability,
also produce more
overall rationality
may also involve
scaling without a
modulus;
eliminates or
reduces populist
elements; need to
ensure judicial
comparison of
cases
modest but  quite
promising response
to problems of
unpredictability and
irrationality
6. Population-
wide
calibration
function
a form of
“predictable
populism”
None reduces variability,
increases
predictability
complicated
administrative task
intriguing, but
probably too
complex and novel
7. Expert
calibration
function
a form of
“technocratic
populism”
None solves problem of
jury ignorance
about effects of
punitive awards
while preserving
centrality of
punitive intent
might not trust
either punitive
intent of juries or
the experts
intriguing and
promising, but less
feasible than 5
above and
probably less
promising than 8
below
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Description Analogies Virtues Vices
Evaluation
8.
Administrative
penalties
bureaucratic
rationality
workers’
compensation
system; social
security “grid”;
administrative
penalties and
fines
could produce both
predictability and
rationality
experts may not be
trustworthy
in principle, the
most promising of
all, as a way of
reducing decision
costs and error
costs
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V. IMPLICATIONS, EXTENSIONS, SPECULATIONS
Our central finding— about the difficulty of mapping
normative judgments onto an unbounded dollar scale— is
relevant to a number of issues now facing law and policy. In
this section, we briefly describe areas on which our data
directly bear.
There is a unifying theme, having to do with the largely
unexplored connection between actual or potential descriptive
findings in psychology and the normative goals of the legal
system. Suppose, for example, that an understanding of
human psychology shows that in certain settings people
cannot do, or will refuse to do, some or all of what the legal
system wants them to do. If this is true, the normative goals of
law will be systematically frustrated. (To paraphrase Herbert
Simon, people will not do what they cannot do.) At least to
some extent, this appears to be so in the context of punitive
damages; the psychology of “mapping” confounds some of
the goals of the award of punitive damages. In the context of
jury determinations, it would then be desirable to
disentangle— as we have attempted to do here— the possible
problems with the existing system, problems revealed as such
by bringing normative analysis to bear on the descriptive
account. Thus it may emerge that a single jury will deviate
erratically from population-wide judgments, or that those
judgments are flawed because they require judgments on
intent to be mapped onto dollars, or that those judgments are
flawed because they do not and cannot be made to grow out
of what is, and should be, the basic goal of the legal system.
In many areas, an analysis of this basic sort may well
apply. We do not know, for example, about the actual
ingredients of a jury’s judgment that the appropriate
compensatory damages for a libelous statement are, say, $1
million— though we do have reason to think that outrage is
highly relevant and that the compensatory award will be
ASSESSING PUNITIVE DAMAGES 87
inflated if punitive damages are unavailable.165 In theory, of
course, the law wants compensatory judgments in the area of
libel to reflect the monetary value of what has been lost as a
result of reputational harm. In practice, it is notoriously difficult
to calculate that value— what evidence could reliably establish
it?— and thus the law relies on crude surrogates. This leaves
the following question: As a psychological matter, do juries do
what they are supposed to do? Might they instead be making
normative judgments about the outrageousness of the
defendant’s conduct, or the innocence of the plaintiff, and
base libel awards on some combination of these judgments
and arbitrary anchors? It is predictable, at least, that the
psychology of libel awards and the goals of the legal system
are in some tension. There is a large research agenda, and
what we have done here is only a start. We outline a few
possible areas for future investigation. We also offer a brief
note on contingent valuation, which raises overlapping but
somewhat different issues.
A. Difficult Damage Determinations
Many damage determinations require juries to undertake
magnitude scaling without a modulus, and to do so in settings
that lack clear market measures. We offer several examples
from the law of compensatory damages, concluding with some
general remarks about the relationship between punitive and
compensatory damages in terms of our discussion here. A
basic underlying question has to do with the appropriate role
of normative judgments in settling on the apparently but (as
we shall see) controversially “factual” question of what
amount would provide “compensation.” Thus there are serious
issues about the populist and technocratic dimensions of
compensatory awards in these domains of the law.
                                                                                                   
165 Anderson and MacCoun, Goal Conflict in Jurors’ Assessments of
Compensatory and Punitive Damages (unpublished manuscript 1997),
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1. Pain and suffering
Awards for pain and suffering raise many of the same
questions as punitive damages. To be sure, and importantly,
such awards are nominally compensatory rather than punitive;
they ask the jury to uncover a “fact.” But they also involve
goods that are not directly traded on markets, and require a
jury to turn into dollars a set of judgments that are, at the very
least, hard to monetize, Thus a standard jury instruction says:
“[T]he law allows you to award a plaintiff a sum that will
reasonably compensate him for any past physical pain. . . .
There are no objective guidelines by which you can measure
the money equivalent of this type of injury; the only real
measuring stick, if it can be so described, is your collective
enlightened conscience. You should consider all the evidence
bearing on the nature of the injuries, the certainty of future
pain, the severity and the likely duration thereof.”166 An
instruction of this kind offers little more guidance than a
typical punitive damage instruction. What is the psychological
process by which such awards are constructed? Can juries or
judges make predictable or otherwise sensible judgments
about dollar amounts? What are the ingredients of those
judgments, whatever the instructions say? Perhaps most
important: What does “compensate” mean, exactly?
Judgments about pain and suffering require juries to make
a decision about harm (with a likely ingredient, in practice, of
intended punishment) and to map that judgment onto a dollar
scale. In the absence of uncontroversial market measures to
make the mapping reliable,167 the resulting verdicts are
notoriously variable, in a way that raises questions very much
like those in the punitive damage setting.168 In particular,
                                                                                                   
166 G. Douthwaite, Jury Instructions on Damages in Tort Actions
section 6-17, at 274 (2d ed. 1988).
167 An effort at disciplining decision is made in W. Kip Viscusi,
Reforming Products Liability 99-116 (1991)
168 See G.A.O., Medical Malpractice: Characteristics of Claims Closed
in 1984, 1-3, 18-19, 23-24, 40-42 (1987); Mark Geistfeld, Placing A Price
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people with similar injuries are often awarded very different
amounts of damages.169 Studies have found that plaintiffs with
relatively small losses tend to be overcompensated and those
with large losses tend to be undercompensated, and also that
there is a significant degree of randomness here.170 Our study
suggests one of the sources of the variability. A judgment
about harm, perhaps made in a predictable way on a bounded
numerical scale, becomes unpredictable and arbitrary when
translated into an unbounded dollar scale lacking a modulus.
In the context of pain and suffering awards, anchors
appear to be especially important, even if they carry
arbitrariness of their own. Thus some jurors appear to split the
difference between the figures suggested by the plaintiff and
the defendant, whereas others use some (fairly random)
multiple of medical expenses, and still others fasten on other
aspects of the case as anchors.171 One study suggests that
severity of injury explains only 40% of the variation in
awards.172
                                                                                                   
On Pain and Suffering, 83 Cal L Rev 773 (1995); Randall Bovbjerg et al.,
Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and Suffering,” 83 NW L
Rev 908 (1989); W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering in Product Liability
Cases: Systematic Compensation of Capricious Awards, 8 Int’l Rev. of L.
& Econ. 203, 204-208, 214-19 (1988).
169 Saks et al., supra note, at 243; Geistfeld, supra note, at 784.
170 Saks et al., supra note, at 245.
171 Id.
172 Bovjberg et al. at 923. A recent study shows an additional point:
Judgments about pain and suffering are highly sensitive to framing
effects. Edward McCaffery, Matthew Spitzer, and Daniel Kahneman,
Framing the Jury, 81 Va. L Rev 1341 (1995). In particular, they are
sensitive to the endowment effect— the fact that people are willing to pay
less to purchase a good than they must be paid in order to get the very
same good if it has been initially allocated to them. Thus losses are
disvalued more than gains are valued. In the context of pain and suffering
awards, the question is whether the plaintiff should be entitled to (a) the
amount that he would have to be paid, before the fact, to allow the
relevant pain and suffering to occur (his selling price) or instead to (b) the
amount that he would be willing to pay, after the fact, to restore his health
to its previous place (his “make whole” price). The recent study shows
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There is the additional problem that pain and suffering
awards are made in a no-comparison condition, and hence
juries may fail to provide the kinds of distinctions that would
emerge if a set of cases were offered at the time of decisions.
And although pain and suffering awards are essentially
compensatory, there can be little doubt that such awards
sometimes reflect jury judgments about the egregiousness of
the defendant’s behavior. Hence such judgments are likely to
have a punitive component. Much further work remains to be
done in disaggregating the factors that produce large or small
awards for pain and suffering.
If the psychology of such awards is similar to that of
punitive damage awards, it will make sense to consider
reforms of the sort discussed here. This could be done by
moving in the direction of a damage schedule to cabin the
jury’s judgment173 or by using a set of comparison cases for
jury or judicial guidance.174 As we shall shortly see, a choice
among the relevant possibilities depends on a judgment about
what might be distrusted in a jury’s determination of pain and
suffering awards— the possibility that isolated juries will
diverge from population-wide convictions, the difficulty faced
by lay people in generating a dollar number for certain
classes of injuries, or something else.
                                                                                                   
substantial differences between (a) and (b), and thus sugggests that
people are highly subject to framing effects in assessing appropriate
awards for damages. Among one group, the “selling price” award was
about double the “making whole” award. See id at 1388.
173 See Geistfeld, supra note.
174 See Patricia Danzon, Medical Malpractice Liability, in Liability:
Perspectives and Policy 101, 121-24 (Robert E. Liton and Cliford Winston
eds. 1988); Kenneth S. Abraham and Glen O. Robinson, Aggregative
Valuation of Mass Tort Claims, 53 Law & Contemp. Probs. 137, 141-46
(1990); Peter Schuck, Scheduled Damages and Insurance Contracts for
Future Services, 8 Yale J. on Reg. 213, 215-19 (1990); David Baldus et
al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages Assessments: A
Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittur Review of Awards For
Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 1109,
1123(1995).
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2. Libel
Similar issues arise in the law of libel, which notoriously
lacks clear measures of damages.175 In fact the common law
rules governing libel reflect the difficulty of generating
monetary amounts.176 Juries are asked to decide how much
loss has been inflicted as a result of reputational injury; thus
plaintiffs are able to recover both for identifiable pecuniary
loss (“special damages”) and also for damages, stemming
from general reputational harm, that cannot be easily
correlated with monetary measures (“general damages”).177
Sometimes plaintiffs are allowed to recover “presumed”
general damages, that is, damages that are awarded without
proving that they have suffered any actual damages, special
or general.178 Evidence from the plaintiff and the defendant is
not likely to establish this amount with any accuracy; if a
movie star has been said to have engaged in adultery, what
kind of award would provide actual compensation? In
practice, the resulting verdicts are unlikely to draw a sharp
line between compensatory and punitive damages.179
For present purposes let us notice that libel awards are
likely to reflect effects similar to those we have discussed.
Here the jury is likely be mapping a complex judgment, about
the quality of the harm and perhaps the nature of the plaintiff
and the defendant, onto an unbounded dollar scale.180 A great
                                                                                                   
175 See Richard Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?,
53 U Chi L Rev 782 (1986).
176 Id.
177 See Marc Franklin and David Anderson, Mass Media Law 214
(1995).
178 Id.
179 See Anderson and MacCoun, supra note x, showing “leakage”
between punitive and compensatory awards: Where punitive awards
cannot be provided, compensatory awards are higher.
180 There is also a predictable difference between the amount that
would compensate a libel plaintiff for injury inflicted and the amount that
would persuade a libel plaintiff to allow his reputation to be damaged in
the relevant way. See McCaffery, Spitzer, and Kahneman, supra note.
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deal of work remains to be done here as well, to understand
the psychology of libel awards and their relationship to what
the legal system is actually attempting to do.
The results of combining a psychological understanding of
juries with an evaluation of the goals of libel law will even
bear on the law of free speech. It is not at all clear that the
significant problem with libel law, for a system of free
expression, consists of findings of liability, which might be
accompanied by simple retractions; the most serious problem
is probably the award of exorbitant sums of money.181 An
understanding of the sources of any such exorbitant awards
will in turn bear on constitutional judgments about the
relationship between libel and the first amendment.
What reforms would be appropriate? Damage caps, often
proposed in the context,182 would have the same kind of
crudeness for libel as in the context of punitive damages.
Perhaps the three kinds of reforms discussed above, suitably
adapted for the purposes of libel law, could be explored to
reduce the unpredictable quality of libel judgments, or to
make them a steadier and more realistic reflection of the
actual goals, compensatory and deterrent, of the law of libel.
3. Intentional infliction of emotional distress and sexual
harassment
The latter half of the twentieth century has witnessed the
rise of two important new legal wrongs: intentional infliction of
emotional distress183 and sexual harassment.184 Both of these
are accompanied by damage remedies. With respect to such
remedies, the basic story should be familiar. Monetization is
                                                                                                   
181 Franklin and Anderson, supra note, at 337, 342-46.
182 See William Van Alstyne, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof,
25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 793 (1984); Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible
Injuries, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 772 (1985).
183 See Robert Keeton and William Prosser, The Law of Torts 54-66
(1984), for an overview.
184 See Catharine MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working
Women (1979).
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extremely difficult. Significant arbitrariness is entirely to be
expected; similar cases may well give rise to dramatically
different awards. How does a jury know what amount would
provide an employee, or a student, with adequate
compensation for quid pro quo or hostile environment
harassment? In both of these contexts, compensatory and
punitive damages are likely to entangled, in the sense that
juries probably do not sharply separate the one from the
other.
In the areas of intentional infliction of emotional distress
and sexual harassment, there may well be a relatively uniform
set of underlying judgments among different demographic
groups, though with sexual harassment it would be most
interesting to see whether there are differences between men
and women or among other groups. This is an intriguing and
entirely feasible empirical project along the lines of our study
here. A principal source of unpredictability is likely to involve
the translation of the underlying moral judgments into dollar
amounts. Here too reform strategies might be based on a
particular conclusion about what is wrong with the outcomes
of jury deliberations— unpredictable awards, inadequate
understanding of the effects of dollar amounts, or a reliance
on improper factors.
4. Compensatory vs. punitive damages: general
considerations
We can bring together some of the strands of this
discussion by noting how the reform proposals discussed
above may or may not bear on compensatory damage awards
that are especially likely to be erratic. The most important
feature of compensatory damages is that they are intended to
restore the status quo ante.185 Punitive damages, by contrast,
are intended to reflect a normative judgment about the
                                                                                                   
185 Note in this regard the difference between the amount a plaintiff
would require to deem himself restored, and the amount a plaintiff would
demand to incur the injury in the first instance. See McCaffery, Spitzer,
and Kahneman, supra note.
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outrageousness of the defendant’s conduct (together with a
judgment about deterrence). Thus the compensatory decision,
far more than the punitive decision, reflects an assessment of
fact (at least in theory186). At first glance this is a sharp
distinction between the two. In this light would it make sense
to consider reforms designed respectively to (a) capture a
population-wide judgment about appropriate compensation,
(b) capture a “compensatory intent” that would be mapped, by
experts, onto dollar amounts, and (c) dispense partly or
entirely with juries on the ground that juries are unlikely to
have the competence to make accurate judgments about the
factual questions involved?
To answer this question it is necessary to ask why juries
are now charged with the task of making judgments about
appropriate compensation in cases in which that inquiry
strains their factual capacities. The most straightforward
answer is self-consciously populist. In cases involving libel,
pain and suffering, sexual harassment, and the intentional
infliction of emotional distress, no institution is likely to be
especially good at uncovering the “fact” about compensation,
if there is indeed any such “fact.”187 Moreover, it is appropriate
(on this view) to let the underlying decision reflect not merely
facts but also the judgments of value that are held by the
                                                                                                   
186 There are many complications here, some of them addressed
below. An obvious issue is what, in this context, compensation is
compensation for. If someone has suffered a month of pain, is
compensation supposed to restore the plaintiff hedonically? To give dollar
equivalents for injury to capabilities and functionings, to be assessed in
part objectively rather than subjectively? See Amartya Sen, Commodities
and Capabilities (1985), for a defense of a “capability” approach to an
assessment of well-being. Because the idea of “compensation” does not
answer such question, the jury’s assessment inescapably creates
normative issues. There is much room here for further descriptive work
(what are the components of that assessment, in fact?) and normative
work as well (what should the question of compensation be taken to mean
in these various contexts?).
187 See note supra.
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community as a whole.188 Whatever fact-finding deficiencies
the jury may have (as compared to, say, a specialized
agency) are overcome by the value of incorporating
community sentiments into the decision about appropriate
compensation for injuries that are not easily monetized. On
this view, compensatory judgments, at least in these contexts,
are not so different from punitive judgments after all; both of
them have important normative components.
Thus the simplest argument on behalf of jury judgments
about compensation is that any such judgment is— perhaps
inevitably and certainly appropriately— not solely
compensatory. It has evaluative dimensions, both in deciding
what compensation properly includes and in imposing
burdens of proof and persuasion and resolving reasonable
doubts. The evaluative judgments, it might be thought, should
be made by an institution with populist features and virtues.
The point may well apply to judgments about compensation
for pain and suffering, libel, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and sexual harassment. A populist institution, on this
view, should be permitted to undertake evaluative judgments
about what amount would “compensate” someone who has
suffered as a result of an improper medical procedure, a lie
about his private life, or an unwanted sexual imposition by an
employer or teacher.
                                                                                                   
188 An underlying question, in all of these areas, involves the extent to
which the damage judgment should be person-specific. Suppose, for
example, that an especially sensitive plaintiff has suffered an especially
severe hedonic loss as a result of libel or sexual harassment— or, by
contrast, that an especially tough-skinned plaintiff has suffered an
unusually small hedonic loss as a result of the same torts. Should a jury
consider the extent to which the plaintiff’s injury was objectively
reasonable, independent of purely hedonic factors? Officially tort law
incorporates a reasonable person inquiry at the level of liability, but once
the defendant has been found liable, the defendant must take the plaintiff
as the plaintiff experienced the injury; in other words, damages
determinations are supposed to be person-specific. But we do not know if
juries are willing to think in these terms, and it is also unclear that they
should.
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In the relevant cases, however, the problem of erratic
judgments, emerging from magnitude scaling without a
modulus, remains. This problem would not be severe (indeed,
it would not be a problem at all) if what appeared to be erratic
judgments were really a product of careful encounters with the
particulars of individual cases, producing disparate outcomes
that are defensible as such because they are normatively
laden. But our study suggests grave reasons to doubt that this
is in fact the case. Thus there is a serious question of reform
strategies. How would the proposals discussed above work
here? The first point to notice is that for compensatory
damages, ranking is far preferable to rating along a bounded
scale; it is certainly useful to see how a jury believes that the
injury at issue compares with other injuries, but far less useful,
when punishment is not involved. to get a sense of the jury’s
numerical rating. A ranking might be used in various ways. If
the basic problem is erratic judgments in the context of
compensatory damages, it might be desirable to use a
conversion formula to obtain a population-wide judgment
about appropriate compensation.
A problem with this approach is that a population-wide
judgment about appropriate dollar compensation might be ill-
informed; it might not reflect “true” compensation. If the
normative dimensions of that judgment seem to deserve a
good deal of weight— if we see the jury’s judgment about
compensation as appropriately reflecting considerations not
involving the apparently factual question of “compensation”—
this approach might well make sense. But if the factual
dimensions deserve to predominate, the jury’s ranking might
be understand as a kind of “compensatory intent,” to be
converted to compensatory awards not by population-wide
data but instead by an administrative or legislative conversion
formula, rooted in a judgment of the appropriate treatment of
the cases against which the case at hand has been ranked.
This kind of reform seems somewhat awkward, for the notion
of “compensatory intent,” supposedly rooted in a judgment
about the facts, is less straightforward than that of “punitive
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intent,” which is an unmistakably normative judgment. But it
would mix populist and technocratic elements in a way that is
mildly reminiscent of the treatment of social security disability
cases— though there the jury is not of course given a role,
displaced as it is by an administrative law judge.189
If the social security disability cases are really taken as a
good analogy, technocratic considerations should
predominate, and the third kind of reform proposal might
seem best. On this view, an administrative or legislative body
might create a kind of “pain and suffering grid,” “libel grid,” or
“sexual harassment grid,” combining the basic elements of
disparate cases into presumptively appropriate awards.190 A
judge would produce a dollar award by seeing where the case
at hand fits in the grid and perhaps by making adjustments if
the details of the case strongly call for them. A technocratic
approach of this kind could eliminate or at least greatly
reduce the problem of erratic awards.191 Whether it is
desirable depends on the value of incorporating populist
elements in the way that the more modest reforms promise to
do.
                                                                                                   
189 Note in this regard that many administrative agencies impose civil
and criminal penalties, and they are also in a position to scale without a
modulus. It would be extremely valuable to have a sense of their practice,
and to know whether they have created some of the same kind of
variability discussed here. See Rubin, supra note, for a discussion of the
similarity between punitive damages and administrative penalties.
190 Compare the analogous proposal for additur and remittitur in
Baldus et al., supra note.
191 There is also an underlying question about the relationship
between rule-bound judgment and particularistic judgment. Standards laid
down in advance may leave room for erratic particularistic judgments if
they are open-ended; but if they are rigid and rule-like, they may prevent
the reasonable exercise of discretion to adapt to the particulars of the
individual case. One issue here is how to minimize both decision costs
and error costs, and in the abstract it is hard to know how much constraint
on particularistic judgment will accomplish that task. For a good
discussion, see Louis Kaplow, Rules vs. Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 43 Duke LJ 557 passim (1992).
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Elements of these various approaches can be found in
reform proposals, thus far restricted to the pain and suffering
context, that attempt to cabin the jury’s judgment by requiring
it to decide in accordance with damage schedules and to
place the case at hand in the context of other cases.192 In
view of the fact that similar problems beset other areas of the
law, there is no reason not to consider similar reforms in the
contexts of libel, sexual harassment, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress. A key issue is the appropriate role of
technocratic and populist elements in the compensatory
judgment. A judgment about that issue will go a long way
toward shaping reforms.
B. Regulatory Expenditures
In the last decade there has been a great deal of interest
in the problem of setting priorities for regulatory expenditures,
both public and private. The “pollutant of the month”
syndrome has given rise to a fear that priorities are set in a
random fashion, and hence that expenditures per life saved
are unpredictable.193 Disparities between different live-saving
programs are quite common and very substantial, to the point
where reallocation of resources could save 60,000 lives per
year (given the same investment as is currently made) or $31
billion per year (given the same number of lives as are
currently saved).194
Frequently, then, government must decide how much to
expend per unit of regulatory benefit, and it is entirely to be
expected that the phenomena that we have discussed here
will come into play. Arbitrariness results partly from the
                                                                                                   
192 See Saks et al., supra note, at 246; Bovbjerg et al., supra note, at
953,
193 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle 1-15
(1993).
194 See Tammy Tengs et al., Five Hundred Life-Saving Interventions
and Their Cost-Effectiveness, 15 Risk Analysis 369 (1995); see also W.
Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs 261-63 (1992) (discussing differences in
expenditure per life saved).
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difficulty of mapping normative judgments onto dollar
amounts, and many regulatory problems are assessed in a
no-comparison condition. Some of the most prominent efforts
at regulatory reform can be understood as self-conscious
responses. The attempt to value regulatory benefits through
the “willingness to pay” criterion introduces a budget
constraint, with accompanying comparative judgments, into
governmental decisionmaking.195 And Justice Breyer’s
influential proposal of a special regulatory working group,196
entrusted with the task of allocating resources to large
problems rather than small ones, is of a piece with his
concerns about rule-free punitive damage awards. The
proposal is designed to ensure risk comparisons and to allow
judgments about dollars to be made by people with a good
deal of experience in the task of “mapping” normative
judgments onto a dollar scale. Justice Breyer’s proposal is in
this sense parallel to the third kind of reform strategy that we
have traced, designed to ensure an institutional reform that
captures the goal, appropriately understood, of risk
regulation: extending human life.
Justice Breyer’s proposal has been criticized as
excessively technocratic.197 Perhaps risk regulation has
multiple goals, and the extension of human life does not
adequately capture them.198 Drawing on the second reform
strategy described above— one that attempts to elicit the
community’s normative judgments— we can imagine initiatives
that would ensure a greater role for population-wide
normative judgments while also promoting more expert
“mapping” onto dollars.199
                                                                                                   
195 See W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs 42-49 (1992).
196 See Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle 59-72 (1993).
197 See Lisa Heinzerling, Politial Science, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 258
(1995).
198 Id.; Richard Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the
Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 86-88 (1995)
199 This is a goal of Richard Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing
the Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 86-95 (1995).
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C. Mapping onto a Scale of Years
Our emphasis throughout has been on an unbounded
dollar scale, but the legal system makes use of another scale:
years. Criminal punishment of course requires a decision
about how to map a normative judgment onto a scale of years.
That scale is not unbounded, in the sense that capital
punishment, or life imprisonment, may be taken as extreme
ends; but it presents a similar difficulty of scaling without an
obvious modulus.200 Thus the use of the scale of years
presents some of the same questions as magnitude scaling in
the absence of a modulus. Before the enactment of the
Sentencing Guidelines, there were serious problems of
arbitrary and unpredictable sentences,201 leading to dissimilar
treatment of the similarly situated. It is reasonable to think that
some of these problems resulted from the difficulty of mapping
normative judgments onto a scale of years.
Is it true that, with respect to criminal punishment, people
have predictable judgments about outrageousness and
intention to punish, but unpredictable judgments about years
of sentence? Our findings here suggest the possibility of an
affirmative answer, but much work remains to be done on this
question. The answer obviously bears on the need for, and
appropriate content of, any sentencing guidelines, and also
on the general question of sentencing reform. Thus those who
challenge the sentencing guidelines might be taken to be
complaining, among other things, about the absence of an
appropriate modulus around which to organize diverse
sentences.202
                                                                                                   
200 See Stevens (1975) did magnitude scaling on jail sentences, and
cross-modality matching against the severity of crimes. See also S.S.
Stephens, (1966, Science, I believe) on ‘scaling the social consensus’ that
was dedicated to that.
201 See Jon Newman, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Risk Worth
Taking, Brookings Rev. 29 (Summer 1987); Sandra Shane-DuBow, Alice
P. Brown, and Erik Olsen, Sentencing Reform in the United States (U.S.
Dept. of Justice, National Institute of Justice 1985).
202 See generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing
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D. A Note on Contingent Valuation
The topic of contingent valuation of course raises the
question whether people can turn their judgments about
regulatory goods into nonarbitrary dollar awards.203 This
problem is well worth considering, both because it is of
interest in its own right and because it is closely related to the
issue of punitive damages in the particular sense that it
involves the mapping of a kind of attitude, desire, or judgment
onto an unbounded dollar scale.204
The goal of contingent valuation methods is of course to
decide how much to value goods that are not traded on
markets. Some people think that valuation might be
ascertained by looking at how people value goods that are in
fact traded on markets.205 But judgments about how much to
spend to reduce statistical risks are highly contextual, and it is
not clear that a decision to purchase a smoke alarm tells us a
sufficient amount about how much people are willing to
reduce (for example) a risk of death from excessive levels of
sulfur dioxide. The use of contingent valuation methods is
inspired by a desire to obtain more specific, contextual
assessments. Rather than looking at actual choices, these
methods ask people hypothetical questions about how much
they would be willing to pay to avoid certain harms or
conditions.206
Despite their apparent promise, contingent valuation
methods have serious limitations, involving the difficulty of
mapping normative judgments onto dollars and the problems
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created by framing effects. A special problem is that of
indifference to quantity, or inadequate sensitivity to scope,
reflected in the fact that people will give the same dollar
number to save 2000, 20,000, and 200,000 birds— or the
same number to save one, two, or three wilderness areas.207
Consider the fact that Toronto residents are willing to pay
almost as much to maintain fishing by cleaning up the lakes in
a small area of Ontario as they are willing to pay to maintain
fishing in all Ontario lakes.208 Thus a similar WTP was found
to preserve 110 or 10,000 acres of wetland in New Jersey.209
Relatedly, the valuation of a resource is affected by whether it
is offered alone or with other goods. Willingness to pay for
spotted owls drops significantly when the spotted owl is asked
to be valued with and in comparison to other species. It is
pertinent in this connection that the order and number of
questions seems crucial in determining valuation. When
asked for their willingness to pay to preserve visibility in the
Grand Canyon, people offer a number five times higher when
this is the first question than when it is the third question.210
What unifies contingent valuation and punitive damage
assessment is the problem of mapping a normative judgment
onto an unbounded dollar scale. Let us notice, then, some
similarities and differences between contingent valuation and
punitive damages. CV studies are sometimes understood as a
method of ascertaining private willingness to pay for public
goods. Despite the flaws of the method if so seen, contingent
valuation is intended as a substitute for market measures.211
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By contrast, punitive damages are awarded on the basis of a
community judgment of some sort; jurors are not asked their
willingness to pay for any commodity. They are asked to
generate a dollar amount that reflects not the value of what
has been lost, but that provides adequate deterrence or
reflects social opprobrium about bad conduct. On the other
hand, in both cases similar biases and distorting influences
may be at work. As noted, both contexts present problems of
mapping morally laden valuations onto dollar amounts.
People may have predictable and nonrandom judgments
about which species are most important, for example, and
they may be able to compare various bodies of water; but a
judgment about monetary valuation may be essentially
arbitrary. And the acontextual character of isolated
judgments— how much is a certain species worth? how bad
was an oil spill?— should make individual judgments less
reliable.212 In fact our findings here have a parallel in the key
conclusions of a study of contingent valuation,213 which also
found that rating scales (e.g., of importance of the problem,
moral satisfaction with contributing to its solution, or support
for government action) are highly correlated with WTP, and
confirmed that the amount of systematic variance was much
lower for WTP than for these scales. Furthermore,
transformations to logs or ranks improve things there, just as
they do here.214
As with punitive damages, it may well make sense to
consider substitutes for the current system of contingent
valuation, perhaps rooted in the same considerations that we
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have discussed here.215 Perhaps policymakers could develop
a small number of scenarios for environmental damages, or
use public judgments on a bounded scale, to begin a process
by which such judgments might be translated into dollar
amounts. New issues could be valued by a survey of attitudes
that would include explicit comparisons to the scenarios in the
original scale.216 Rather than asking people for dollar values,
people would make assessments in terms of importance, and
those judgments would then be mapped onto dollars by
reference to the standard scale. Obviously proposals of this
kind raise complex questions that we cannot resolve here;217
we signal the issue only to emphasize the linkage with
punitive damages and the general problem of mapping in the
face of (potentially) shared moral judgments and (likely)
erratic dollar amounts.
VI. CONCLUSION
Why are jury determinations about punitive damages
sometimes erratic and arbitrary? A large part of the answer
lies in the difficulty of “mapping” normative judgments,
including those of outrage and punishment, onto dollar
amounts. This answer operates against an important
backdrop: with respect to judgments of both outrage and
punishment, important domains of law may show substantial
agreement in normative judgments, and the consensus
operates across differences of gender, race, age, education,
and income.
The fact that people have difficulty in making judgments on
an unbounded scale of dollars helps fortify and specify the
basis for Justice Breyer’s complaint,218 grounded in rule of law
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considerations, that some jurisdictions do not provide
sufficient constraints on jury discretion. The point also
suggests that the solution does not lie in clearer jury
instructions. Any effort to increase predictability in the award
of punitive damages will be successful if and only if it assists
with the task of mapping. If community judgments matter, legal
reform should attempt to elicit the community’s punitive intent,
and do so in terms of some response mode other than dollars.
When the legal system translates punitive intent into
dollars, it must answer questions about the extent to which
the law should incorporate, qualify, or work against the jury’s
determination. We have suggested reforms that embody
different answers to those questions. Any ultimate conclusion
depends on a specific assessment of what is wrong with
current punitive damage awards. We have suggested three
general possibilities: sheer variability; inadequate
assessment, by ordinary people, of what different dollar
awards will accomplish; or a focus, by ordinary people, on
improper factors as the foundation for punitive awards. Thus
an assessment of the normative issues requires an
identification of the nature of the populist ideals that underlie
the institution of the jury, and a judgment about what place,
exactly, those ideals deserve to have in light of juror
psychology.
Our study shows that the characteristics of jury judgments
include high sensitivity to outrage (and likely low sensitivity to
the probability of detection), substantial sensitivity to harm,
substantial sensitivity to firm size, susceptibility to anchors,
and a backward-looking focus on retribution. A translation
phase might incorporate or reject one or all of these
characteristics; it may or may not be founded on the jury’s
punitive intention. At a minimum, our study strongly suggests
that appellate judges and district courts should continue the
practice, found in some courts, of rejecting punitive awards
that are out of line with general practice and relevant
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comparison cases219— especially because, as we have
shown, the dollar awards of any particular jury are not likely to
reflect the population’s judgment about appropriate dollar
awards. A more dramatic approach— probably the best for the
long term, though not without risks of its own— would involve
the development of a system of administrative penalties for
serious misconduct, based on judgments made in advance
and subject to democratic control.
Our findings have implications well beyond the area of
punitive damages. Three implications are of special
importance. First, there is, in the personal injury cases studied
here, a high degree of agreement within diverse demographic
groups with respect to both outrage and punishment. It is
possible that there is a similar consensus across other
domains; thus ample room remains for further related work. It
would be valuable to see, for example, whether such a
consensus exists across gender with respect to compensatory
damage awards, or punitive damage awards, for pain and
suffering or sexual harassment; it would be valuable too to
see whether there are substantive areas in which race,
education, age, and wealth have measurable effects.
Relatively simple studies could produce evidence on some
much-disputed questions.
Second, our study raises serious doubts about whether
jurors are able to make sensible judgments about dollar
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awards in cases in which market measures are unavailable,
and it throws into sharp relief the question whether this task
should not be given to judges or to some other institution. The
legal system is not occasionally but pervasively in the
business of requiring people to map their judgments onto
dollar amounts, and outside of the context of punitive
damages, the translation is likely to suffer from the same
problems found here. In particular, difficulties with mapping
probably affect jury awards of damages for libel, pain and
suffering, sexual harassment and other civil rights violations,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress— all of which
notoriously suffer from unpredictability, in part, we believe, as
a result of unbounded dollar scales. The consequence is that
rule of law values are badly compromised. Reform proposals
might ensure against unfairness (in the form of dissimilar
treatment of the similarly situated) and unpredictability for
both individuals and firms, plaintiffs and defendants alike.
More particularly, reforms involving “compensatory” awards in
these controversial areas must be evaluated by an
assessment of the appropriate place of purely factual
judgments, for which juries are not especially well-suited.
Thus the three kinds of punitive damage reforms may well
have parallels in each of these areas.
Third, our findings support the general proposition, on
which there is growing consensus, that both values and
preferences are often constructed, rather than elicited, by
social situations.220 In their various social roles, people lack a
preexisting “master list” of values and preferences from which
to make selections in situations of choice. This is true for
consumer choices, which depend on context and alternative
options, as well as for medical decisions,221 politics, and
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law.222 It is true as well for judgments made by jurors, judges,
representatives, and citizens generally. Rather than emerging
from some menu in the mind, these judgments are a function
of procedure, description, and context. In the legal context in
particular, participants are pervasively in the business of
constructing procedures, descriptions, and contexts.
Frequently they have not been self-conscious about that
point.
To be sure, there is no uncontroversial way to develop the
context and frames for eliciting, or constructing, social
preferences and values. But some ways are worse than
others, because they make people perform tasks for which
they are ill-equipped— or, more specifically, produce poor
translation of some plausible “bedrock” set of normative
judgments, generate arbitrariness, aggravate the problem of
selective attention, exploit heuristic devices that produce
error, or provide people with too little understanding to yield
sensible or consistent decisions. We have suggested some
ways to handle these problems with the award of punitive
damages, where bedrock judgments do seem discoverable
through the right methods, and where the legal system allows
those judgments to be transformed into dollar amounts in
erratic ways. Both the problem and the potential solutions
bear on many issues now facing the legal system.
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APPENDIX 1. EXCERPTS FROM INSTRUCTIONS
In this study we would like you to imagine that you are a
juror for a legal case in a civil court. Civil law suits can involve
disputes between private individuals, companies, or
individuals and companies, in which the plaintiff alleges that
the defendant harmed them or their property in some way. A
civil suit is brought by a plaintiff for the purpose of gaining
compensation from the defendant for the alleged harm.
Civil suits involve two different types of penalties that
could be imposed upon a defendant that is found liable for
damages. Compensatory damages are intended to fully
compensate a plaintiff for the harm suffered as a result of the
defendant’s actions. Punitive damages are intended to
achieve two purposes: (1) to punish the defendant for unusual
misconduct, and (2) to deter the defendant and others from
committing the same actions in the future.
In the cases you will consider, the defendant has already
been ordered to pay compensatory damages to the plaintiff.
This does not necessarily mean that punitive damages must
also be awarded. Whether or not punitive damages should be
awarded and, if so, how large they should be, is completely
separate from compensatory damages.
Punitive damages should be awarded if a preponderance
of the evidence shows that the defendants either acted
maliciously or with reckless disregard for the welfare of
others. Defendants are considered to have acted maliciously
if they intended to injure or harm someone. Defendants are
considered to have acted with reckless disregard for the
welfare of others if they were aware of the probable harm to
others but disregarded it, and their actions were a gross
deviation from the standard of care that a normal person
would use.
Civil suits differ from criminal cases, in which the
government prosecutes an individual or a company for
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alleged violations of the law. Plaintiffs in a civil trial must
prove their claim by “a preponderance of the evidence,” which
means that it is more likely than not that the plaintiff’s claim is
justified.  This differs from criminal trials, where the
prosecution must prove the defendant’s guilt “beyond a
reasonable doubt.”
In each of the cases you will consider, the jury (of which
you are a member) has already decided to accept the
plaintiff's claim. As a consequence the jury has ordered the
defendant to pay $200,000 in compensatory damages to the
plaintiff as full compensation. The defendants are large
[medium-sized] companies with profits of $100-200 [$10-20]
million per year.
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APPENDIX 2. PERSONAL INJURY SCENARIOS
Mary Lawson
Mary Lawson, a manufacturing worker, developed chronic
anemia. Although after a hospital stay she is now better, the
condition has not been fully cured. She believes that
exposure to benzene in her work place caused the condition
and sued her employer, TGI International. The jury (of which
you are a member) ordered TGI International to pay her
$200,000 in compensation.
TGI International is a large company (with profits of $100-
200 million per year) that manufactures high-tech machine
parts. Some years ago the scientists at TGI International
discovered that manufacturing workers at Mary Lawson’s
plant were often exposed to benzene, a substance that can
cause anemia, leukemia and cancer. Internal documents
show that the top management at TGI International decided
not to do anything about the problem, because benzene
levels in the plant were slightly below the maximum level
allowed by OSHA regulations. They thought that the risk was
worth taking and that “with any luck no one will get sick”. They
also decided against warning the workers, because “warnings
would just create panic”.
Frank Williams
Frank Williams suffered serious internal injuries when the
braking system on his motorcycle failed to work at a traffic
light. He felt that that the brakes were defective, and sued
National Motors, the company that manufactures and sells his
motorcycle. The jury (of which you are a member) ordered
National Motors to pay him $200,000 in compensation.
National Motors is a large company (with profits of $100-
200 million per year) that makes motorcycles, scooters, and
other motorized single person vehicles. The evidence showed
that the braking system used by National Motors has a basic
design defect. National Motors was aware that “there might be
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a problem with our brakes,” because in pre-market tests, the
defect appeared on several occasions. But the pre-market
tests were not extensive, despite the fact that auto industry
regulations require elaborate testing. Internal company
documents show National Motors’ belief that “it would be quite
expensive for us to do much more now, we can't be certain we
have a serious problem here, and anyway we can fix the
problem afterwards if it really does turn out to be serious.”
Thomas Smith
While he was visiting the circus, Thomas Smith was shot
in the arm by a security guard who mistakenly thought that
Smith had threatened another customer with bodily harm. The
security guard was drunk at the time. Smith sued Public
Entertainment, the company that operates the circus. The jury
(of which you are a member) ordered Public Entertainment to
pay him $200,000 in compensation.
Public Entertainment is a large company (with profits of
$100-200 million per year) which operates circuses and public
fairs. Fred Williams, the security guard who was involved in
the incident, is an alcoholic with a history of incidents of
drunkenness on the job. During one of these incidents
Williams took out his gun and started waving it around wildly,
but he did not shoot anyone. Public Entertainment had
repeatedly warned Williams to “clean up his act” but took no
other action. In his company personnel file Williams was
described as “basically a good guy with a bit of a drinking
problem, but not enough of a risk to fire him.”
Susan Douglas
Susan Douglas suffered significant injuries to her legs and
neck when an airbag in her car opened unexpectedly while
she was driving the vehicle. She believes that the airbag was
defective and sued the manufacturer, Coastal Industries. The
jury (of which you are a member) ordered Coastal Industries
to pay her $200,000 in compensation.
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Coastal Industries is a large company (with profits of
$100-200 million per year) that specializes in parts and
accessories that can be added to existing vehicles, such as
adding the latest safety equipment to older cars. While its
airbag conforms to the requirements stated in government
regulations, it does not include certain additional “fail-safe”
systems that are used in other airbags to ensure against
accidental opening. Internal documents show that most but
not all of the Coastal Industries designers believed that their
system “is certainly safe enough, even if it does not include all
possible safeguards” and that their marketing department said
that “there will be no market for our airbag if we raise its price
by adding more safety bells and whistles.”
Carl Sanders
Carl Sanders used Nalene, an over-the-counter baldness
treatment available at drugstores. While a small amount of
hair did grow back, he also developed severe side-effects,
including open sores on the scalp and permanent brown spots
over his forehead. He sued the manufacturer, A&G
Cosmetics. The jury (of which you are a member) ordered
A&G Cosmetics to pay him $200,000 in compensation.
A&G Cosmetics is a large company (with profits of $100-
200 million per year) that sells many different cosmetic
products, including wigs, “weaves” and chemical solutions
designed to combat baldness. Nalene has proven effective in
promoting hair growth in 30% of people in clinical trials.
However, Nalene caused unpleasant side effects in some
cases, although none were as severe as those Carl Sanders
experienced. When marketing Nalene, A&G Cosmetics did
not fully disclose these findings. It only said “minor side
effects have been observed in a very small number of people
tested.” While this amount of disclosure was within legal
limits, other companies that make hair products voluntarily
disclosed more about their products.
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Sarah Stanley
Sarah Stanley, a seventy-five year old woman, suffered
serious back injuries as a result of following an exercise
video, “Good Health For All,” that she purchased through her
local community health center. When Stanley attempted to
perform the exercises, she found herself unable to do so, but
she pressed on beyond her physical capacities. She claimed
that she was not adequately warned of these dangers and
sued the producer of the video, Gersten Productions. The jury
(of which you are a member) ordered Gersten Productions to
pay her $200,000 in compensation.
Gersten Productions is a large company (with profits of
$100-200 million per year) that produces informational
materials in health-related fields, including videos on many
topics concerning healthy lifestyles. The “Good Health for All”
video contains a series of exercises suitable mostly for people
in good shape and good health. The exercise coaches and
models in the video are all relatively young, and no federal or
state law requires exercise videos to come with any special
warning for elderly people. The witnesses in the case testified
that Gersten Productions believed that most people would be
able to tell when the exercises were beyond their capacities,
that Good Health for All has produced good results for almost
all people who have seen it, and that very few people had
reported injuries of any type from doing so.
Jack Newton
Jack Newton, a five year old child, was playing with
matches when his cotton flannel pajamas caught fire. He was
severely burned over a significant portion of his body and
required several weeks in the hospital and months of physical
therapy. His parents sued the manufacturer of the pajamas,
Novel Clothing. The jury (of which you are a member) ordered
Novel Clothing to pay the Newtons $200,000 in
compensation.
Novel Clothing is a large company (profits of $100-200
million per year) that specializes in making clothes for
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children. Before marketing the pajamas, Novel conducted the
tests normally used in the industry for problems like
flammability, and observed no incidents like the Newtons
experienced. Companies in the industry as well as federal
regulators have known for a while that it is possible to add
extra fire-retardant chemicals to their fabrics (in addition to
those specified in current regulations), but these extra
measures are not required. The process is very expensive,
and no other manufacturers currently use it. Internal
documents show that the management of Novel Clothing had
decided that “when it comes to costly safety innovations we
will follow our competitors. We don't want to be less safe than
anyone else but we don't have to lead the way either.”
Low Harm version:
Jack Newton, a five year old child, was playing with
matches when his cotton flannel pajamas caught fire. His
hands and arms were badly burned, and required regular
professional medical treatment for several weeks.
Joan Glover
Joan Glover, a six year old child, ingested a large number
of pills of Allerfree, a non-prescription allergy medicine, and
required an extensive hospital stay. The overdose weakened
her respiratory system, which will make her more susceptible
to breathing-related diseases such as asthma and
emphysema for the rest of her life. The Allerfree bottle used
an inadequately designed child-proof safety cap. The Glovers
sued the manufacturer of Allerfree, the General Assistance
company. The jury (of which you are a member) ordered
General Assistance to pay the Glovers $200,000 in
compensation.
General Assistance is a large company (with profits of
$100-200 million per year) that manufactures a variety of non-
prescription medicines. A federal regulation requires “child-
proof” safety caps on all medicine bottles. General Assistance
has systematically ignored the intent of this regulation by
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selling tens of thousands of bottles of medicines with a child-
proof safety cap that was generally effective, but had a failure
rate much higher than any others in the industry. An internal
company document says that “this stupid, unnecessary
federal regulation is a waste of our money”; it acknowledges
the risk that Allerfree may be punished for violating the
regulation but says, “the federal government has many other
things to worry about and probably won't bother us on this”
and in any case “the punishments for violating the regulation
are extremely mild; basically we'd be asked to improve the
safety caps in the future.” An official at the Food and Drug
Administration had previously warned a vice president of
General Assistance that they were “on shaky ground” but the
company decided not to take any corrective action.
Low Harm version:
Joan Glover, a six year old child, ingested a large number
of pills of Allerfree, a non-prescription allergy medicine. She
had to spend several days in a hospital, and is now deeply
traumatized by pills of any kind. When her parents try to get
her to take even beneficial medications such as vitamins,
aspirin, or cold remedies, she cries uncontrollably and says
that she is afraid.
Martin West
Martin West, a right-handed disabled veteran who lived in
a two story house, was seriously injured in a fall when the
chain broke on his electric lift-chair (a device that allows
someone to be carried up stairs in a chair that moves up and
down an angled track). He fell from near the top of the stairs
and tumbled awkwardly all the way to the bottom landing,
damaging his spinal cord in the process. As a result he now
has only partial control of his right arm, a condition which
doctors believe is permanent. He sued the manufacturer of
the lift-chair, MedTech Products. The jury (of which you are a
member) ordered MedTech to pay him $200,000 in
compensation.
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MedTech Products is a large company (profits of $100-200
million per year) that manufactures many types of medical
equipment, including wheelchairs, car-lifts, and other devices
used by the disabled. The lift-chair is a new product for
MedTech, and instead of producing a new design, company
engineers decided to adapt the design of the hydraulic lifts for
cars already on the market. Unfortunately, there are several
unique problems in designing a safe and effective lift-chair
that are beyond the experience of the company’s engineers.
Product managers said that hiring new engineers with the
proper expertise was “too expensive, and would take too long”
and ordered current engineers to “just do the best you can,
but be sure you meet our deadline for announcing the
product.” The inexperience of the engineers and the rush to
meet the product announcement date led to testing
procedures that were less rigorous than those required by
federal medical product regulations.
Low Harm version:
Martin West, a left-handed disabled veteran who lived in a
two story house, was injured in a fall when the chain broke on
his electric lift-chair (a device that allows someone to be
carried up stairs in a chair that moves up and down an angled
track). He fell from near the bottom of the stairs and tumbled
to the bottom landing, injuring his spinal cord in the process.
His right arm was paralyzed for several weeks, after which
doctors were able to repair most of the injury, and he was
able to regain most of the previous range of motion in the
arm.
Janet
Janet Windsor, a secretary who works on computer
equipment, developed a rare form of skin cancer. After a long
course of painful chemotherapy, doctors were able to cure the
cancer, although they cannot be sure that it will not return.
She believed that it had been caused by the computer
monitors that she worked on and sued the manufacturer,
118 CHICAGO WORKING PAPER IN LAW AND ECONOMICS
International Computers. The jury (of which you are a
member) ordered International Computers to pay her
$200,000 in compensation.
International Computers is a large company (profits of
$100-200 million per year) that manufactures components of
computer systems. The type of International Computers
monitor that Ms. Windsor used emits an unusually high level
of radiation compared to other similar monitors, a level that
pushes the limit in government safety guidelines. Internal
company documents cite experts who concluded that “the
evidence that this level of radiation could create any serious
risk to health and life is weak and tentative”. The company
was not legally required to disclose the unusual level of
radiation, and it did not do so.
Low Harm version:
Janet Windsor, a secretary who works on computer
equipment, suffered from frequent and severe migraine
headaches. As a result, for several years she often
experienced nausea, insomnia and depression, and missed
many workdays and family events.
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APPENDIX 3. RESPONSE MODE MANIPULATION
Outrage
Which of the following best expresses your opinion of the
defendant’s actions? (please circle your answer)
Completely
Acceptable
Objectionable Shocking Absolutely
Outrageous
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Punishment
In addition to paying compensatory damages, how much
should the defendant be punished?  Please circle the number
that best expresses your opinion of the appropriate level of
punishment.
No
Punishmen
t
Mild
Punishmen
t
Severe
Punishmen
t
Extremely Severe
Punishment
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
$ Damages
In addition to paying compensatory damages, what
amount of punitive damages (if any) should the defendant be
required to pay as punishment and to deter the defendant and
others from similar actions in the future? (please write your
answer in the blank below)
$ _____________________
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APPENDIX 4: EXPERIMENT DESIGN
Samples and Procedures
The sample had good representation from various
demographic and socio-economic groups. For example,
respondents were 44% male; 64% Caucasian, 16% African-
American, 15% Hispanic; median income = $30K-$50K;
median education = some college; median age = 30-39.
Thirty-two respondents were dropped from the sample
because they gave incomplete responses or failed to
understand the task.
The survey was conducted at a downtown hotel.
Participants were run in large groups at pre-arranged times
over a four day period. Most respondents completed their task
in 30 to 45 minutes.
Each respondent received three pages of general
instructions and four numbered envelopes. The first three
envelopes contained the materials for Parts 1, 2 and 3 of the
study, as described below. The fourth envelop contained
demographic question and debriefing information. The
instructions (which are excerpted in Appendix 1)included (1)
an overview of the survey procedure, (2) an explanation of the
task of jurors in civil (as opposed to criminal) trials, (3)
definitions of and distinctions between compensatory and
punitive damages, including the fact that compensatory
damages had already been awarded in the cases they would
consider, (4) a summary of standard legal conditions for
punitive damages (maliciousness or reckless disregard for the
welfare of others), and (5) a reminder about the standard of
evidence required in this situation (preponderance of the
evidence).
Design and Stimuli
Ten scenarios describing personal injury cases were
constructed. The first six were used in Parts 1 and 2 of the
procedure and the other four in Part 3. Each respondent rated
some version of all ten scenarios. Envelope #1 contained
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material about one of the scenarios. Envelope #2 contained
five other scenarios. Envelope #3 contained the four
scenarios used in Part 3 of the experiment.
In Parts 1 and 2, between-subjects manipulations were
response mode (Outrage, Punishment or $ Damages) and
firm size (annual profits of $10-$20 million (Medium) or $100-
$200 million (Large)), and scenario sequence, including which
scenario was evaluated first, in isolation from the others (in
Part 1 of the procedure). Scenario order was counterbalanced
using a Latin square so that each scenario appeared in each
ordinal position with equal frequency. Table 2 shows the
wording of the evaluation questions in the three response
modes. Instructions in all scenarios stated that compensatory
damages of $200,000 had already been awarded.
Part 3 had the same structure as Parts 1 and 2, except
that the isolation manipulation was replaced by a
manipulation in which the degree of harm suffered by the
plaintiff was varied. For each of the four scenarios used in
Part 3, we formulated a high-harm and a low-harm version.
For example, in the case in which a child playing with
matches was burned when his pajamas caught fire, the
injuries were described as “He was severely burned over a
significant portion of his body and required several weeks in
the hospital and months of physical therapy” (high harm) or
“His hands and arms were badly burned, and required regular
professional medical treatment for several weeks” (low harm).
This Working Paper is a tentative and preliminary version of
an article that will be published in the Yale Law Journal. The
research on which the article is based will be described in
detail in a forthcoming article by Daniel Kahneman, David
Schkade, and Cass R. Sunstein in the Journal of Risk and
Uncertainty. Readers with comments should address them to:
Cass R. Sunstein
Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of
Jurisprudence
The Law School
The University of Chicago
1111 E. 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
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